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PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO:
RECONSIDERING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Ruth L. Okediji*

Of course, when it comes to deciding on the correct
interpretation of the covered agreements, a panel will
be aided by the arguments of the parties, but not
bound by them; its decisions on such matters must be
in accord with the rules of treaty interpretation
applicable to the WTO.
WTO Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. Complaint
Concerning India's PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland
AgriculturalChemical Products, WT/DS50 /AB /R (Dec. 19,
1997).

Cooperative international relations... internationalize

and partially transcend nationality.
MARTIN SHAw, A THEORY OF THE GLOBAL STATE, GLOBALITY AS
AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTIoN 28 (2000).

INTRODUCTION

Almost a decade after coming into effect, the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS Agreement") remains a controversial but forceful
William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
This Article is part of an ongoing multidisciplinary research project examining the
development of international intellectual property law in the post-Uruguay Round
era. Some of the arguments were presented during the Panel "TRIPs, Patents and
Politics" at the Emory International Law Review NEXUS Symposium: An
Interdisciplinary Forum on the Impact of International Patent Trade Agreements In
Thanks to Indronil
the Global Fight Against HIV and AIDS in April 2003.
Chakarbarty, Graeme Dinwoodie, Paul Goldstein, Dan Farber, Keith Maskus, Tade
Okediji, Joel Trachtman, and participants at Faculty Workshops at Georgetown Law
Center, Boston University School of Law, and Notre Dame Law School for comments
on the monograph from which this Article was developed.
1 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol.
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legacy of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements. At its
momentous conclusion in 1994, the TRIPS Agreement was
both over and underestimated. Pessimists who questioned
the enforceability of the substantive provisions and its longterm efficacy in addressing infringement in global markets
must concede that the celebrated Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) 2 has, in fact, been an important
mechanism in transforming national intellectual property
legislation worldwide. The minimum requirements of the
TRIPS Agreement are now reflected in the legislation of
most member countries and several important disputes
have been determined.' This "formal" compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement, however, pales in comparison to the
"soft" compliance mechanisms that exist through the work
of the TRIPS Council 4 and in the preliminary, but
mandatory, steps of the DSU process.5

31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2:
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSUI.
' See infra Part III; see also Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the
Sources of (International)Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 585, 636-48 (2001)
[hereinafter Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement] (providing a comprehensive chart of
WTO TRIPS disputes from 1995-2002).
' See TRIPS Agreement art. 68 (establishing the Council on TRIPS and defining
its responsibilities to include monitoring the operation of TRIPS "and, in particular,
Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members
the opportunity of consulting on matters related to trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights"); Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with
TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 411 (1996)

(emphasizing that the Council and World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat are
"whenever possible, to resolve differences between countries without a need for
formal recourse to dispute settlement"). See generally Kal Raustiala, Compliance
and Effectiveness in InternationalRegulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 387 (2000) (arguing for the efficacy of soft compliance and a strong role for the
TRIPS Council).
5 See Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 3, at 616-25 (summarizing
the stages of the dispute settlement process). See generally Ruth L. Okediji, Rules of
Power in an Age of Law: Process Opportunism and TRIPS Dispute Settlement, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Kwan Choi & James Hartigan eds.)

(forthcoming 2003/2004) [hereinafter Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law]
(arguing that emphasis in the DSU on diplomatic solutions to disputes can yield
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Optimists who anticipated that the TRIPS Agreement
would significantly limit global piracy or otherwise lead to a
healthy respect and appreciation for the utility of
intellectual property laws as agents of economic growth and
development6 must now confront the complex and highly
controversial problem of access to essential medicines which
has raised important and persistent questions about the
appropriate scope of patent protection under the TRIPS
Agreement and corresponding welfare losses in developing
and least developed countries.7 The HIV/AIDS epidemic
thrust the TRIPS Agreement into the epicenter of a global
and very public debate about the merits of intellectual
property protection. However, issues about the cost of
access to goods protected by proprietary systems, or the
ability of developing countries to invoke limitations on the
scope of exclusive rights, reflect enduring problems of the
international intellectual property system.
Despite the orthodoxy that the Uruguay Round
Agreements reflect a package deal arduously negotiated
through linkage strategies, it is still pertinent to consider
the nature and source of the welfare bargain reflected in
the TRIPS Agreement.
This question is particularly
important because the dispute settlement process arguably
should have been the forum for resolving the pernicious
greater levels of compliance than required by TRIPS especially for developing
countries).
6 See generally Eric H. Smith, Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559 (1996).
Expansive patent protection has also generated some negative welfare effects
for developed countries, particularly in the United States. There are increasing calls
for the reform of the U.S. patent system for institutional and policy reasons. See
generally Symposium, Patent System Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002);
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts
and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1035 (2003).
' See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 736-59 (1996) (reviewing the history of
developing country participation in the international intellectual property system
and the implications of TRIPS provisions on development concerns).
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debates about the interpretation of TRIPS Article 31, the
legitimacy of parallel importation, and other arguments
raised by developing countries in attempts to delimit the
reach of expansive proprietary interests. The choice by
developed and developing countries to seek compromise
outside of the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO
has important implications for the development of a public
welfare jurisprudence predicated upon the explicit language
of the TRIPS Agreement.
This Article analyzes the role of the TRIPS dispute
settlement process in integrating public welfare
components into the development and application of
international intellectual property norms. Despite explicit
provisions regarding development concerns and the
aspirations of developing and least developed countries, it is
unlikely that unilateral determinations of a national
welfare calculus will play a significant role in interpreting
the TRIPS Agreement. Indeed, outcomes of TRIPS disputes
suggest that exposure of a domestic public policy to the
DSU process can have the perverse result of calcifying the
pervasive ideology of maximalist property rights on a global
scale, thus limiting policy spaces within which countries
may advance specific visions of welfare in national
intellectual property laws. Thus, the choice to utilize
diplomacy instead of the dispute settlement process in
addressing the public health crises arguably was a superior
strategic move. Nevertheless, the failure of the dispute
process to explicitly articulate welfare considerations in the
interpretation of TRIPS provisions suggests that within the
specific context of international intellectual property law,
the constitutional function of the state to regulate
intellectual property policy for domestic welfare is
vulnerable to subversion by strategic uses of the WTO
' Of course, there were self-serving reasons behind the decision
States to forgo formal complaints against developing countries who
TRIPS limitations to develop responses to the public health crises.
however, are irrelevant to whether the decision had welfare enhancing

of the United
had relied on
The motives,
benefits.
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system of mandatory supranational adjudication for
purposes of constraining the policy choices available to a
member state.
Part I of this Article seeks to complement the rich
literature on the TRIPS negotiations by utilizing insights
This account of the negotiations
from game theory."
through the lens of coalition theory establishes an
analytical context within which the entrenched role of
private industry actors can be strategically assessed. Part
II introduces the two-stage game as a model to evaluate the
implications of dispute settlement on sovereign discretion
over domestic intellectual property policy. The first stage of
the game is the negotiation of TRIPS. This stage was
characterized by coordination of developed country
standards in order to facilitate a common bargaining
position. As with coordination games, developed countries,
notwithstanding their own policy differences, recognized
that they were each better off with an agreement than with
This resulted in coalitions between developed
none.
countries that made negotiation of a global set of standards
a feasible objective.
The stage two game is the enforcement process. Having
accomplished the primary goal of binding developing
countries to high standards of intellectual property
protection, developed countries must now deal with the
costs of "winning" the first stage game. These include
constraints on sovereign discretion in the area of policy
development, and battles over extant policy differences
between the member states."
'0 See generally Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual
Property Standard Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 765 (2002); SUSAN K. SELL,
POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST

(1998). See also infra Part I.
" While many differences between developed countries were addressed during
the Uruguay Round, the broad principles adopted in those cases where no agreement
could be accomplished are subject to interpretation by member states. See generally

J.H. Reichman, Securing Compliance With the TRIPS Agreement After U.S. v. India,
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Part III of this Article reviews three significant decisions
concerning the interpretation of provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement. Contested interpretations of TRIPS provisions
are the domain of the WTO dispute settlement process; but
as the product of private/public coalitions, it is now almost
impossible to interpret TRIPS provisions without the
influence of the private sector. Consequently, any proposals
for the global health crisis, or other access issues in
intellectual property, must address the role of industry in
the development of national and international intellectual
property policy. Dispute resolution in the WTO is unlikely
to yield outcomes that disturb the strong presumption of
protection for owners in a global marketplace. Even in
circumstances where the member state may advance its
own national interests as a necessary factor in assessing
TRIPS compliance, the primacy of internationally agreed
upon standards over domestic interests is a notable feature
of international economic agreements. Indeed, within the
context of free trade, assertions of domestic welfare
objectives often are viewed as pretexts for protectionism.
Consequently, it should be the role of the WTO dispute
settlement process to evaluate such assertions and to
determine when welfare interests should count in the
interpretation of intellectual property norms.
The explicit consideration of public welfare in assessing
TRIPS compliance is a necessary aspect of resolving
competing claims brought in the shadows of ambiguous or
politically sensitive treaty provisions. It is an important
constitutional function of the state to advance these goals,
and of the WTO dispute settlement process to integrate
them in interpreting TRIPS provisions.
Both these
elements are necessary for the development of a global
jurisprudence of public welfare that might more readily
permit intellectual property rights to coexist with other

1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585 (1998) [hereinafter Reichman, Securing Compliance].
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regimes designed to improve the conditions of human
existence worldwide.
I.

GAMES, TRIPS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

Setting the Stage for Games: Understandingthe Stakes

A

The TRIPS negotiations resulted in an Agreement that in
many respects reflected prevailing U.S. law and policy.12
However, the specter of enforceable dispute resolution
fundamentally alters the malleability that is generally
associated with such international accords. Many of the
intellectual property issues negotiated during the Uruguay
Round produced "rules" and "standards"13 in the TRIPS
Agreement. As with national intellectual property laws,
the standards contained in the Agreement generally involve
limitations on the rights of owners to facilitate access by
users or downstream innovators in an effort to promote
general welfare. Within the TRIPS Agreement, countries
retain the sovereign prerogative to determine the conditions
under which such access mechanisms can be utilized and

12

The TRIPS Agreement extends patent protection to inventions in all fields of

technology, as long as the inventions are "new, involve an inventive step, and are
capable of industrial application." TRIPS Agreement art. 27. These correspond to
the U.S. Patent Office requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. 35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2001). The TRIPS Agreement extends copyright
protection to "expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or
mathematical concepts as such." TRIPS Agreement art. 9. This requirement
corresponds to the U.S. Patent Office protection of "original works of authorship." 17
U.S.C. §102 (2001).
13 In law and economics terminology, a rule specifies precise conduct in advance
while a standard establishes general guidance. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956 (1995). See also Joel P. Trachtman,
The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 334 (1999)
[hereinafter Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution].
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the responsibility to utilize them in a manner consistent
with the stated objectives.
It is uncontroversial to assert that member states cannot
pursue future domestic policy interests without considering
the effects on the TRIPS Agreement "bargain." However,
determining what that bargain is when a conflict arises, is
the purview of dispute settlement.
The "strict
constructionism" interpretative approach adopted by WTO
panels affectively establishes a "lock-in" position for
member states once formal compliance (i.e., changes in
legislation) has been affected.14 Policy changes inconsistent
with the strong protectionist ethos reflected by the TRIPS
Agreement are easy cases of violation under this
interpretive rule, despite the conservative posture of the
rule. Put simply, policy changes that might calibrate the
domestic balance in a manner deemed necessary for
domestic welfare, but that do not enhance owner's rights,
could invoke the skepticism of trade partners, and may lead
to threats to invoke the dispute settlement process. 16 Thus,
it would seem that the only unequivocally TRIPS-consistent
policy "moves" for member states are those that could afford
greater levels of protection." In the event that a state is
unwilling to be locked in, or that domestic interests lead the
state to adopt legislation that is considered less protective
of owner's rights, the WTO dispute settlement process will
"4 For the first articulation of the strict constructionist approach to TRIPS
disputes, see WTO Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. Complaint Concerning
India's Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. v. India]; World Trade

Organization Report of the Panel on U.S. Complaint Concerning India's Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R
(Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. v. India Panel Report].
"' See, e.g., U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14. See generally, Reichman,

Securing Compliance, supra note 11 (discussing the Appellate Body's strict
constructionist approach).
16 In another work, the author has examined the signaling features of the DSU
stages and strategic uses of threats to invoke the DSU process. See generally
Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law, supra note 5.

" At best, members are locked in at the TRIPS Agreement level of protection, as
construed by WTO Panels or the Appellate Body.
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become the focal point of strategic dueling as countries vie
for interpretations more consistent with their own national
positions on the issue at stake.
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, developed countries
already shared substantially similar levels of intellectual
property protection.
Thus, bald violations of basic
intellectual property norms were unlikely to be the
principal source of conflict between these countries.
Instead, claims of TRIPS violations between developed
countries were more likely to require interpretation of the
unharmonized
policies that reflect each country's
5
underlying philosophy of intellectual property."
In the
context of the TRIPS Agreement, the strategic windfall of
adjudicated harmonization is particularly valuable: as the
TRIPS negotiation experience demonstrates, a coordinated
platform by developed countries on any number of issues
facilitates the extraction of rent on a global scale. The only
"cost" for these countries is the political one of limiting
sovereign prerogative over domestic policy. Ostensibly, this
is a cost that is also shared by developing and least
developed countries, thus contributing to the myth of parity
between countries in the WTO system. 9
Insights from game theory, in particular coalition
formation theory, facilitate an appreciation for why
developed countries, particularly the United States (which
historically has been obdurate in yielding its sovereignty to
"' In some instances, the policy at issue may not be intellectual property, but,
instead, a related subject such as environmental law, public health, or national
security. These policies may compete in the domestic setting of a particular state, or
one state's policy in an area may conflict with that of another state to produce
different TRIPS interpretation and, hence, implementation. Just recently, the
Appellate Body did as much in a case involving U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. See
WTO Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. and EC Complaint Concerning Section
211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, at para. 360
(Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Havana Club].
"' But see generally Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power?
Consensus-Based Bargainingand Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339
(2002) (examining how, despite the consensus-based rules of the GATT/WTO,
countries may still use power to affect outcomes).
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international legal processes), would initiate the creation of
an international regime that impinges upon sovereign
prerogative to develop domestic policy," particularly in a
constitutionally reserved subject like intellectual property.
Of course, it is possible that the "lock-in" effect of
significant standards of intellectual property protection was
a surprise for the United States (suggesting game-theoretic
irrationality) or that policy makers anticipated this effect
and welcomed it as a means of securing costless
acquiescence to industry demands for stronger and stronger
intellectual property rights." A game theoretic model
provides some insight into why the bargain concluded
under the TRIPS Agreement was a significant payoff for
developed countries who typically are more concerned about
sovereignty.
In the classic prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix, the
dominant strategy equilibrium is that which gives each
20 Other scholars may not share the author's skepticism of the so-called
"residual" state power to develop intellectual property policy.
See generally
Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 11; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS
Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441 (2000) [hereinafter Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes
of Age] (arguing for cooperation rather than a conflict approach to TRIPS
enforcement and suggesting government to government undertakings as one means
to approach resolution of claims of TRIPS violations by developing countries). While
the explicit language of TRIPS reflects a disposition to defer to local laws, and
TRIPS panels have acknowledged this deference, the very need to construe the
substantive provisions of TRIPS suggests less predictability in the outcome of
disputes, not more. The power of dispute panels to interpret and construe TRIPS is
the basis of the author's doubtfulness about the certainty of state power over the
future of intellectual property policy. Invariably, dispute resolution is a form of
legislation, as well as the place where legislation derives its meaning and power.
As Professor
Dispute resolution establishes the legitimacy of the statute.
Trachtman puts it, "[d]ispute resolution is . . . a socially immanent governance
mechanism to be used to establish a particular type of governance in a particular
social setting." Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 337.
21 Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 335 (noting the
possible use of international fora as a way to integrate sub rosa); Ruth Okediji,
Toward an InternationalFair Use Standard, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 86
(2000) [hereinafter Okediji, Fair Use Standard] (suggesting that international fora
provide a convenient means to transfer political costs of contested copyright
policies).
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player the best outcome regardless of what the other player
chooses.22
The shared objective of heightened global
standards
for intellectual property engendered
a
cooperative game among developed countries during the
TRIPS negotiations. In game theory, this pre-commitment
to cooperation typically alters the expected outcome of the
game in unforeseen ways because standard prisoner's
dilemma generally assumes an inability to communicate as
the key cause of the choice conundrum. In the case of the
TRIPS Agreement, the negotiating process ensured a
substantial degree of communication and cooperation
between the United States, the European Community (EC)
and other developed countries. If there was extensive
communication, thus removing a central assumption behind
prisoner's dilemma, why might the result-a compromised
ability to make independent policy-nonetheless be
classified as a "bad" outcome for these countries in welfare
terms?
The coordinated game during the TRIPS Agreement
negotiations did not include any agents for what can loosely
be described as welfare interests. A classic public choice
problem was evident: an unorganized, disaggregated public
cannot mobilize to influence the state as effectively as
intellectual property industries.2"
Yet, deliberative
22

AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY

85-87 (1999).

While generally speaking this is still true, NGO's and other consumer welfare
groups have recently proven effective at neutralizing the activities of the copyright
industries in the agenda for maximalist protection. The 1996 World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) copyright treaties remain the leading examples of
this strategic effort to balance the legislative scales between users and owners of
creative works. For a detailed account of the negotiating process that culminated in
the WIPO digital treaties, see generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital
Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 396 (1997). However, domestic implementation
of these treaties arguably undermined the efforts of these public interest groups.
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright and Information Policy, in 4
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 299 (Kraig M.

Hill et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Litman, Digital Copyright and Information
Policy]. To appreciate the "voice" of the copyright industry alone, consider that, in
1999, motion pictures, sound recordings, music publishing, print publishing,
computer software, theater, advertising, radio, television, and cable broadcasting
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policymaking enriched by voices representing different
perspectives and interests is imperative for balanced
regulatory systems. 4 The rent-seeking activities that have
engendered most intellectual property legislation in major
developed
countries dispense with the normative
safeguards that are an indispensable part of good
governance. Rent-seeking devalues democratic virtue by
allowing only some citizens to be heard and not others; it
occludes reasoned debate about what constitutes the public
interest and how best to accomplish welfare goals for
society as a whole.
In sum, successful rent-seeking
transforms the state into an agent of a particular segment
of society instead of a guardian of welfare for all.
Consequently, the result of a coordinated strategy, such as
the TRIPS Agreement, must be viewed as it has been with
healthy skepticism. When these same intellectual property
interest groups motivate states to invoke the WTO dispute
settlement process, and when that process is inadvertently
together contributed approximately 4.9% or $457 billion to the U.S. economy. Since
1995, the contribution of these industries to the GDP has increased over 10%. See
STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2000
REPORT 3-4, 9 (2000). For a recent exhaustive critique of the social, constitutional,
and legal ramifications of U.S. implementation of the WIPO digital treaties, see
generally Litman, Digital Copyright and Information Policy, supra. The possibility
of "government failure" as described by critics of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) provide ammunition to those who advocate direct applicability of the
WTO agreements and private party standing before WTO panels. See generally E.U.
Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994
Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161 (1995);
Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue-The Making of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 WORLD COMPETITION
L. & ECON. REV. 137 (1994). It also reinforces the argument that the state and the
international system should operate in concord to secure domestic welfare. At the
very least, the international order should not be deployed against domestic welfare
by re-enacting the government failure at the international level.
24 See generally Litman, Digital Copyright and Information Policy, supra note 23.
25 See Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 456 (noting
the open secret that private industries have "the greatest access" to the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR), the chief officer responsible for protecting U.S. trade
interests), at 452-53. According to Professor Reichman,
[Ilntellectual property owners who most dominate the process are pressing
maximalist claims and interpretations of TRIPS standards that are
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aided by rules designed primarily to constrain state
discretion in areas where concessions have been explicitly
negotiated (i.e., trade in goods), then the international
order is also effectively transformed into an agent of the
interest groups.
In this context, contrary to modern
assumptions in public international law and international
relations theory, government failure at the national level is
not likely to be rectified, but instead reinforced if the TRIPS
Agreement is interpreted and enforced without significant
analysis and accommodation of domestic constitutional
goals or policy objectives. A vital inquiry, then, is about the
nature of the relationship between the "domestic" and the
"international" and how the interaction between the
spheres should be constructed 26 in view of the

Id.

consistent with their earlier negotiating position, but are often inconsistent
with the black letter rules . . . even organized efforts to provide technical
cooperation under Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement have sometimes
reportedly degenerated into crude propaganda exercises that give exclusive
voice to the views of the high protectionist coalition.

26 Of course, one way to address the relationship
between the domestic and
international domain is to view the latter as an extension of the former, or viceversa. Clearly, there is reverberation across these two spheres. The question is
whether and how to regulate primarily for domestic interests in the context of
greater economic interdependence. As the author elaborates later, the tendency
under the WTO regime is to esteem the "multilateral trade system" as the principal
value of both spheres, and thus to treat enforcement of WTO obligations as an end in
itself. This approach is premature given the degree of unresolved conflicts in
substantive intellectual property policies of developed countries.
Instead,
enforcement of TRIPS provisions (or other agreements) should reflect an attempt to
help nations make good on their promises to each other in light of their
responsibility for domestic concerns and to constituents. The two domains should
interact to accomplish specific welfare goals within each discipline under the
jurisdiction of the WTO. This is particularly important given the lack of agreement
over a global competition policy which can more directly regulate conditions for
competition in innovation, and thus promote some welfare interests. Disagreement
over fundamental principles and basic tenets of competition policy suggests that this
discipline is unlikely to be brought under the aegis of the WTO anytime soon. See
Hans Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection,Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition
Policy, in ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? 153 (John 0. Haley &
Hiroshi Iyori eds., 1995). Yet, the competitive balances for countries differ
significantly and it is possible that domestic competition policy can be used to
attenuate the effect of TRIPS. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Trade, Competition,
and Intellectual Property-TRIPS and Its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 VAND. J.
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constitutional imperative regarding intellectual property
regulation and the moral function of the state.27

TRANSNAT'L L 481 (1996). Globalization has simultaneously strengthened the need

to have a harmonized framework for competition policy, as well as the desire of
states to maintain domestic control over the direction and use of competition law.
Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly provides for this in Article 8(2) which states
that, "[aippropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions
of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property
rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade
or adversely affect the international transfer of technology." TRIPS Agreement art.
8(2). But see Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 459
(discouraging incautious use of such powers by developing countries). Unilateral
resort to regulatory powers as a means to circumvent TRIPS may have some shortterm domestic benefits, but these are likely to be outweighed by long term adverse
consequences to innovation, foreign direct investment flows and over all efficiency.
See J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 52-58 (1996-97) [hereinafter
Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers]. In sum, there are numerous policy
variables that could affect the interpretation/implementation of TRIPS in a country,
ranging from foreign relations policy. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Requests
for Consultation Concerning EC Regimen for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution
of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (1997), to environmental policy. See WTO Appellate
Body Report on Requests for Consultation Concerning U.S. Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (1988) [hereinafter Shrimp
Panel Decision], to health policy, innovation policy, and public safety (WTO Panel
Report on EC Complaint Concerning Canada's Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, WT/DS114/R (2000) [hereinafter Canada-Patent Protection]. Further,
there are different sources of international obligations in these areas and the
relationship between treaties is an important, if overlooked, area that may generate
the potential to limit the effect of TRIPS in order to advance legitimate domestic
policy objectives. While TRIPS reflects an agreement between developed countries
over the most basic principles of protection in respective intellectual property
categories, this consensus was limited precisely because there was an absence of
genuinely harmonized policies. In applying even these minimum principles, the lack
of policy harmonization is likely to yield different views of what the provisions mean
as evidenced by the Canada Pharmaceuticals case. Another point is worth noting:
the greater the pressure on the dispute settlement process, the more likely that
states will resort to "policy shopping" to avoid the effects of TRIPS on domestic
welfare (or in response to domestic political pressures). This is already evident in
WTO disputes that implicate other areas such as the environment. See, e.g., Shrimp
Panel Decision, supra. As Professor Reichman puts it, "hard-nosed confrontational
strategies for implementing TRIPS standards risk backfiring by revealing the full
extent of residual disagreement, as reflected in conflicting state practices." See
Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 458.
27 See generally John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 205 (2002) (raising concerns about the influence of globalism on
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For the immediate purposes of this Article, however, the
issue is that the WTO dispute settlement process offers
unprecedented strategic opportunities for intellectual
property owners to secure economic rents on a global scale
through TRIPS enforcement. 8 International law doctrines
are easily employed to aid this objective through application
of the rules of treaty interpretation.29 The veil of legitimacy
imposed by the international process at best obscures, and
at worst marginalizes, the domestic welfare issues that
inevitably are implicated in the process of TRIPS dispute
settlements. Consequently, this celebrated mechanism of
global enforcement has the potential to yield perverse
outcomes for domestic policy. In this scenario, the utility of
the "interface"3 approach that seeks to manage the
differences between economic and legal systems, or the
more rudimentary negotiation of national and international
or
design choices,
institutional
through
domains
interpretive tools, is effectively compromised as the

American constitutional autonomy and system of popular sovereignty).
2 Despite the focus in this Article on the possible use of the international
process by intellectual property owners, the argument is also applicable to groups
advocating on behalf of intellectual property users. It should be noted, however,
that current conditions based both on relative domestic influence as well as the
idiosyncrasies that characterize the international process make it less likely that
user groups will be able to penetrate the WTO system as effectively as the
intellectual property industries.
29 Article 3(2) of the DSU provides that the dispute settlement system of the
WTO "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law." DSU art. 3(2).
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered by the WTO as a
primary source of rules of interpretation of international law. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
For discussion on how these rules may yield distorted
Vienna Convention].
outcomes in the context of TRIPS disputes, see infra Part III.
30 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 345-46 (2d ed. 1997) (describing various
approaches for dealing with global interdependence). Professor Jackson describes
the interface approach as one which recognizes the existence of different (economic)
systems and endeavors to create means-for example, through institutions, regimes,
or agreements-to ease the tension and conflicts between the different systems. Id.
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"international" negates or, in effect, replaces the "domestic"
through a well-established hierarchy of laws. 1
If disputes between developed and developing countries
will merely reinforce the strong protectionist ethos of the
TRIPS Agreement, disputes between developed countries
will likely stretch the minimum requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement through interpretations that are consistent with
that ethos. Under these circumstances, both developed and
developing countries committed to domestic welfare
priorities may have incentives to deviate from the
Agreement in attempts to defend felt sovereign prerogatives
in the area of intellectual property policy.32 Of course,
demonstrations of "sovereignty" often mask a show of
power,33 to circumvent the discipline imposed by

", In the United States, the hierarchy of laws is as follows: the Constitution
supercedes all laws and treaties; treaties and federal statutes are of equal status,
subject to the later-in-time-rule. Courts are expected to apply treaties and federal
law consistently to the extent possible. Last, there is state legislation.
See
generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1957); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmts. b-d (1986).

" This would happen, of course, assuming that the state is indeed acting as a
social welfare planner, i.e., acting in a purely competitive market and/or is
motivated by distributive justice concerns in its allocation of public goods. One
might argue that the recalcitrance of the United States in implementing the decision
of the WTO panel in United States-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act is an example
of an explicit demonstration of this predilection. See WTO Panel Report on U.S.
Request for Consultations Concerning Section of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter 110(5) Panel Report]. However, it may
also be the case that this is an example of how domestic intellectual property policy
offers a veneer of legitimacy for what is essentially an attempt to circumvent the
discipline imposed by international organizations.
"' See Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and
Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 313 (2001) (stating that "the commitment of the
United States to its treaty obligations has recently been put in question" by
persistent breaches of treaty obligations such as the refusal to pay U.N. dues).
Professor Vagts also notes the growing tendency by the Executive Branch to
rationalize treaty breaches through the U.S. later-in-time rule, with the resulting
casual treatment of the binding effect of international legal obligations. Id. He
concludes, however, that despite many attempts by the United States to modify
treaty obligations, the number of instances where treaties have been in fact
breached are not really significant when compared to the number of treaties that
bind the country. Id. at 333.
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international organizations.34 As one school of international
relations theory posits, the ability of states to choose when
and under what circumstances they will abide by
international rules is dependent on power realities."
The failure of a state to fulfill its international obligations
by refusing to abide by welfare decreasing interpretations of
an international agreement may reflect the state's
fulfillment of its internal constitutional mandate to act as a
social welfare planner. In the context of multilateral trade,
such claims are generally viewed with a measure of
skepticism, as they tend to conceal protectionist tendencies,
usually in response to domestic interest group pressures.
The classic economic conviction about such claims is that
they are, in fact, attempts to undermine and not promote
domestic welfare.3" Indeed, a major accomplishment of
"' In the context of domestic implementation of international law agreements,
Professor Petersmann argues that:
WTO law-like GATT law-includes many precise, unconditional and
justiciable guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law, private
intellectual property rights and judicial review. Yet, the attempt by
governments, even in constitutional democracies like those of the EC states
and the USA, to limit the "domestic law effects" of their self-imposed
international guarantees of freedom and non-discrimination illustrates that
the foreign policy concern over lack of reciprocity and over inequality of
domestic enforcement procedures is considered more important than the
"general interest" of their citizens in making their WTO market freedoms
more effective through the direct applicability and judicial protection of
WTO law. This primacy of foreign policy over the individual rights of
citizens reflects a power-oriented perception of the government.
Petersmann, supra note 23, at 168.
" The origins of Realism are traced back to Thucydides, a Greek philosopher.
400
See generally THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (T. E. Wick ed., 1982) (c.
B.C.). See Robert Keohane, Theory of World Politics: StructuralRealism and Beyond,
in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 503 (A. Finifter ed., 1983).
36 As Adam Smith argued in his case against mercantilism:
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interests
of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary
for promoting that of the consumer .... But in the mercantile system, the
interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the
producer; and it seems to consider production, and not consumption, as the
ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce.
...It is altogether for the benefit of the [producer] that the [consumer] is
obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost
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multilateral free trade under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 7 has been to facilitate
transparency
between
nations
by
exposing
"protectionism"-that is, rules, policies or practices that
operate to distort the free flow of trade by favoring domestic
producers and markets, thus undermining the domestic and
global welfare benefits of the free trade ideal."
In the realm of intellectual property, however, the notion
of "protectionism" should be understood differently from
protectionism in the trade context.
The underlying
presumption of the TRIPS Agreement is that strong levels
of intellectual property protection will enhance domestic
and global welfare. Accordingly, rules, practices, or polices
that are perceived to weaken intellectual property rights, or
that dilute the strength of the property interest granted by
intellectual property laws, are viewed with equal or greater
disapproval under the TRIPS regime as "protectionist" with
all the accompanying negative connotations from the trade
context.
As a consequence, a utilitarian intellectual
property policy like that of the United States (or utilitarian
aspects of policies in other countries) is likely to be suspect
under this new order, despite the fact that this policy has
facilitated the advancement of tremendous creative
endeavor. As scholars have strenuously argued, it is
precisely the limitations and exceptions to proprietary
rights that stimulate competition in innovation and which
can foster higher levels of innovative activity.39 With regard
to intellectual property, then, "protectionist" efforts to
balance intellectual property rights by imposing constraints
on enforcement under certain conditions are welfarealways occasions....
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Vol. I, at

159 (Edwin Carman ed., Methuen

& Co. Ltd. 1920) (1776).
3' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S.

1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].

31 SMITH, supra note 36, Vol. II at 169-70.

" Professor Jerome Reichman, among others, has written extensively about this.
See, e.g., Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers,supra note 26.
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maximizing both because they are beneficial to sustained
creativity and, in the public health example, because access
to health care contributes directly to development.
Further, when the government asserts its sovereign
prerogative to negotiate treaties that reflect the

considerable influence of domestic industries, it sets the
stage for an outcome that also undermines the welfare ideal
of the free trade model.4" Specifically, in the face of an
adverse decision by an international body, the government
may choose not to assert its sovereign prerogative in order
to preserve a domestic bargain that it has made with
interest groups.41 Of course, complying with the decision of
an international tribunal pursuant to a treaty by which a
state is bound is a requirement of international law. 42 To
the extent that sovereign nations, particularly hegemons,
choose compliance, this is also laudable.43 The perverse
40

See Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7

IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 125-47 (1999).
41

This may occur, for example, by choosing not to appeal an adverse WTO

decision to the Appellate Body as happened in the United States Section 110(5) case,
see supra note 32.
42 Most notable is the international law canon of pacta sunt servanda codified in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. It states "Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention,
supra note 29, art. 26.
The organizing inquiry of international law is "is international law law?" In
other words, how is order imposed on sovereigns? See generally LoUIS HENKIN, HOW
NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979). International relations theories, particularly regime
theorists, explain state cooperation in terms of strategies, incentives, and rational
choice. Thus, order is not imposed but is desirable or expedient for the achievement
of common ends. Despite different methodologies, both disciplines accord varying
degrees of recognition to constitutive elements of a broad "penumbral interest" in
complying with international obligations. One of these is "reputation" or "goodwill"
or "honor." See Vagts, supra note 33, at 323-29 (discussing the various elements of
the penumbral interest). Without these "incentives" to cooperate, states are
described as in a "state of nature" where anarchy reigns. As the Supreme Court
described it in 1884:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends
for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the
subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual
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result is that the international decision is insulated from
domestic and international scrutiny of its domestic welfaredistorting behavior, while simultaneously providing a
powerful rationalization of the outcome. The use of the
international process to circumvent the rigor of domestic
democratic processes, while invoking the honor of treaty
observance to avoid (or at least mitigate) domestic political
repercussions, and at the same time undermine the precept
of state responsibility to its domestic constituents, is an
incredible strategic masquerade.
Assertions of sovereign prerogative in the face of
international obligations, or reliance on international
obligation to excuse domestic government failures, are both
equally subversive of the institutions and processes that are
designed to facilitate the operation of the rule of law in both
the domestic and international arena. It invokes Realist
views of states as completely focused on their own power in
relation to the power of other states. In the classic Realist
view it is power, not law that predominates international
relations and determines outcomes in the absence of a
central authority.44 In this view, rules of international
behavior and the institutions responsible for developing and
enforcing them are but convenient
agents for
demonstrations of state power.45 Actions really taken for
reasons of power may be rationalized by international law.46
Similarly, domestic policy may be used to rationalize
actions that are inconsistent with international law.47 A
war.
Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
4

See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS

104

(1979)

(surveying a variety of theories on state behavior). See generally Petersmann, supra
note 23.
41 See Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 190-91 (1982).
46

Id.

For example, national security or defense is often a classic example of a
domestic concern that has been considered as "legitimate" cause for deviation from
international obligations. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 73 (security exceptions).
Sometimes treaties will provide specific examples of exceptions that may be invoked
4'
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classic Realist perspective might suggest that there is no
need to rationalize such expressions of state power.
Rationalizations of aberrant acts, however, are expedient if
a state desires both the gains of cooperative agreements
and the benefits of unfettered sovereign discretion. A
purportedly justifiable deviation from agreed upon norms
might vindicate such breaches of the agreement.48
B. CoalitionTheory and the Story of the TRIPS Negotiations
There have been limited attempts to develop a theoretical
framework to evaluate the negotiation strategies that
secured the successful conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement.49
Rationalizations that depict the TRIPS Agreement as
by members. More likely, however, treaties tend to provide a number of subjects
that may provide grounds for a member to employ unilateral prerogative by explicit
reservations of sovereign residual power or by recognition of a certain scope for
sovereign initiative. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 30, 31 (examples of the
former).
48 See HENKIN, supra 43, at 13-27 (discussing the nature
of "law" from a broad
perspective. Professor Henkin observes that states feel compelled to give excuses for
derogation and this fact evidences some binding force of the treaty.). At first blush,
retreat by the United States from the enforcement arm of TRIPS seems implausible
given the priority accorded to intellectual property protection by the United States
at the onset of the Uruguay Round. However, the cooperative coalition of state and
industry that comprised U.S. leadership in the context of the TRIPS negotiations is
unlikely to be sustained in the face of aggressive international adjudication that
implicates the divergent views on intellectual property protection among developed
countries.
'9 For examples of early efforts at this task, see David A. Lax & James K.
Sebenius, Thinking Coalitionally: Party Arithmetic, Process Opportunism, and
Strategic Sequencing, in NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 153 (H. Peyton Young ed., 1991) (a
game theoretic analysis of multilateral negotiations). See generally INTERNATIONAL
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION (I. William Zartman ed., 1994) (a compilation of a
series of essays employing different theoretical perspectives to multilateral
negotiations. Several of the contributing authors apply insights specifically to the
Uruguay Round.). See also Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and LinkageBargain Diplomacy of InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 535, 561-66 (1998) (employing linkage-bargain diplomacy to analyze
the TRIPS negotiations). In many important respects, linkage-bargaining is a
subset of coalition theory. Coalitions develop because complementary self-interests
are attainable through linkages of shared goals or possible trade-offs among
prospective members of the coalition.
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another example of North-South power disparities tell a
much too simple story. Indeed, one of the noted triumphs of
the Uruguay Round was the unprecedented level of
developing country participation in the negotiations."
Within the specific context of the TRIPS negotiations,
alliances that formed over a variety of subjects crossed the
traditional North-South divisions. These alliances also
included industry groups whose positions on issues
(ultimately of tremendous influence on official government
positions) also had to be reconciled with competing intraindustry priorities. 5' Given the tremendous coordination
problems typically faced in multi-party negotiations,
coalitions constituted the coordinating mechanism that
facilitated coherent substantive positions of intellectual
property owners. 52
There are two general classes of coalition formation
theories rooted in game theory; power theories and policy
theories.53 Power theories predict what type of coalitions
will form by relying on information about the power
positions of the actors.54 Because power theories exclude
any policy preference between the actors, they are also
called policy blind.
However, policy theories use one or
more multidimensional scales to factor in the policy
positions of the players in order to predict what coalitions
50 See generally JACKSON, supra note 30.

" See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS (1998).
52

The negotiating history of TRIPS has already been well documented and the

following analysis incorporates only a limited review of the relevant moments of that
history. See generally id. See also Evans, supra note 23, at 137; Ryan, supra note
49, at 558-67 (providing a condensed version derived primarily from the account in
Evans, supra note 23).
" See generally B. Grofman, The General Irrelevance of Zero Sum Assumption in
the Legislative Context, in COALITIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 99 (M.J. Holler ed.,
1984); Ad. M. A. van Deemen, Dominant Players and Minimum Size Coalitions, 17
EUR. J. POL. RES. 313 (1989); T.A. Caplow, A Theory of Coalitionsin a Triad, 21 SOC.
REV. 489 (1956).
" See generally Caplow, supra note 53. See also WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 120-21 (1973).
"' See RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 54, at 2.
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will emerge." Finally, coalitions are cooperative alliances
that can produce regimes.57 They should not be considered
as regimes per se, although in the cooperative process they
may exhibit characteristics that are typical of regimes
broadly conceived.
Social scientists, particularly political scientists and
economists, have studied coalition formation as a form of
rational behavior to explain social issues ranging from
voting, majority rule, and cabinet formation, to virtually all
aspects of representative government. 8
Behavioral
assumptions articulated by political scientists posit that
political actors must form winning coalitions because
"[m]ost things that people want they cannot get by
themselves.
The TRIPS Agreement is certainly
representative of the fact that coalition formation is an
indispensable aspect of political interaction in the
international sphere. ° The process of coalition formation at
the international level is a reflection of the relationship
between domestic politics and international economic
policy; coalition formation in the international sphere is
56

See ABRAM DE SWAAN, COALITION THEORIES & CABINET FORMATIONS 75

(1973).
" Regimes are defined as a set of implicit or explicit (or a combination of both)
"norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actor's expectations
converge." See Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982). Regimes may or
may not involve formal agreements. Id.
58 In this regard, coalition formation is, in essence, a subset of collective choice
theory. Put differently, coalition theory replaces standard models of game theory in
situations where two or more players choose to act in coordination, or are compelled
to do so in order to accomplish mutually beneficial objectives. Collective choice
theory uses economic models to analyze democratic government. Collective choice
refers to the fact that in a democracy, people have to come together to decide who
will rule. Coalition formation, in this sense, is properly viewed as a part of this
theoretical premise.
'9 William H. Riker, The Place of Political Science in Public Choice, 57 PUB.
CHOICE 247, 249 (1988).
60 I. William Zartman, Two's Company and More's a Crowd, The Complexities of
Multilateral Negotiation, in INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION:
APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEXITY 1, 6 (I. William Zartman ed.,
1994).

842

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

influenced by factors exogenous to the international
domain, and simultaneously a part of that domain as well.61
In short, the dichotomy between national and international
affairs is increasingly difficult to sustain. The overlapping
domains with respect to just one state actor, becomes
unmanageable when multiple actors converge to negotiate a
multiplicity of issues as is typically the case in multilateral
trade negotiations.62 Indeed, the characteristic use of
coalitions in multilateral settings is one way to manage this
complexity," even as it introduces an additional set of
64
issues to the broader negotiation process.
C. Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement and its Coalitions

It is common knowledge that the United States pioneered
the introduction of intellectual property in the Uruguay
61

With particular respect to intellectual property, a number of scholars have

noted the convergence of national and international law making processes. This is
partly a by-product of harmonization efforts as well as a reflection of influence of
multinational actors exerting influence on policymakers worldwide. See generally
Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 3; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Development
and Incorporation]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of Domestic and
InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307 (2000)
[hereinafter Dinwoodie, Integration]; Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational
Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the "Three-Step Test" for Copyright
Exceptions, in REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT DAUTEUR 72 (2001) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Toward SupranationalCopyright Law?].
62 Zartman, supra note 60, at 4-7 (noting that multilateral negotiations
are
characterized by coalitions).
63 Id. at 8-9 (identifying the major themes of small group analysis and
powercoalition analysis as analytical tools).
64 This is because, as is evident in the discussion of the coalitions
formed during
the TRIPS negotiations, coalitions form on different bases for different reasons. The
cumulative environment that is engendered as this dynamic process of coalition
building unfolds in the context of negotiation renders the application of any one
theory to explain the how and why of the outcome necessarily incomplete, much less
the application of these same theories to evaluate the substantive meaning of the
outcome.
Subsequent discussion in this Article attempts to sketch the main
theoretical insights and apply them in evaluating the TRIPS Agreement outcome as
interpreted by the dispute panels.
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Round. However, intellectual property had been somewhat
directly regulated under the auspices of GATT, the
institutional antecedent of the WTO. When the Uruguay
Round formally commenced in 1986, the issue of trade in
counterfeit goods was a tested basis for the extension of the
trade discipline to broader issues of intellectual property
protection.66 Despite conflicting views between developed
countries about how precisely to integrate intellectual
property in the GATT framework,67 concerns about the
feasibility of such integration,68 and the steadfast resistance
of some developing countries to GATT as a forum for
intellectual property negotiations,69 the political will to
extend the trade regime to intellectual property eventually
gathered momentum after the initial proposals by the
United States and other developed countries were
introduced." The proposal to include trade-related aspects
65 See

Gunnar Sjostedt, Negotiating the

Uruguay Round of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION:
APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEXITY 44, 69 (I. William Zartman ed.,
1994). See generally David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property
Rights: Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. INT'L L. 893 (1989).
66 Evans, supra note 23, at 158-59. See also Sjostedt, supra note 65, at 49-50.
" Even the proposals from various developed countries were in conflict and
attempts to reconcile the proposals to reach a complete consensus were unsuccessful.
GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 10.
66 Developing countries' opposition to GATT has been
the subject of much
commentary. This opposition was both substantive and institutional; some countries
believed that WIPO and not GATT was the appropriate forum to address intellectual
property negotiations. Other countries simply opposed the linkage of trade with
intellectual property. From the outset, developing countries, notably Brazil and
Argentina, opposed the idea of intellectual property in the GATT framework. See
GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 10. India, Mexico, and Thailand were also vocal about
their concerns over the proposed merger of the two areas. See id. at 13 n.50. Over
time, this opposition was overcome, primarily through the bargaining process. In
exchange for higher levels of intellectual property protection, developing countries
negotiated for greater concessions in textiles and agriculture. See Will Martin & L.
Alan Winters, The Uruguay Round: A Milestone for the Developing Countries, in THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-14 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters
eds., 1996).
69 The Group of Ten was particularly intransigent. This coalition comprised a
cross section of countries from South America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
70 GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 13 n.49 (stating that by 1987, it
was "already quite
clear that a number of participants wanted a very far-reaching agreement" and that
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of intellectual property on the Uruguay Round agenda was
supported by a coalition of forty countries, consisting
primarily of developed countries, and adopted by the
Ministerial Conference in Punta del Este.7
Prior to the formal commencement of the TRIPS
negotiations, members of private industry in the United
States, concerned about inadequate foreign protection of
patents, championed a trade-based strategy for securing
greater protection of intellectual property rights. 72 Tradebased efforts in this regard were already established
73
through the use of Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act.
Indeed, much of the ground work in pressuring developing
countries to negotiate the TRIPS Agreement was done
through threats or actual exercise of the Section 301
power.7 4 However, the case-by-case, country-by-country
approach, though effective, was costly to industry, which
often provided government with the details of the alleged
violations. 75 The process was also time-consuming and
involved significant transaction costs, often of a political
the United States, Switzerland, the European Community, Japan, and the Nordic
countries all tabled proposals).
7" The Punta del Este declaration set the framework for the TRIPS Negotiating
Group. The declaration included trade in counterfeit goods and linked the previous
GATT regime with the prospects of developing a broader understanding and
agreement in the new Round. See GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round, Sept. 20 1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19, 25-26 (1987); Sjostedt, supra
note 65, at 44-54 (providing an evolutionary narrative of the Uruguay Round,
particularly an overview of the events leading up to the ministerial declaration in
Punta del Este; describing the various coalitional forms at different stages of the
Uruguay Round negotiations).
72 See Ryan, supra note 49, at 562.
" See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2001). See also Evans, supra note 23, at 148-54
(describing pre-TRIPS unilateral responses to alleged intellectual property
violations overseas).
" Evans, supra note 23, at 154-58 (discussing the countries targeted by Section
301).
75 See, e.g., U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14 (the seminal
TRIPS
Agreement case under the WTO system). The USTR was alerted to India's alleged
TRIPS violation by the Senior Vice President of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America. His letter to former USTR Charlene Barshefsky is
attached as Annex 3 to the Panel Report. See id. Annex 3.
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nature.76 International relations scholars have pointed out
that without regimes, international law is a system of "selfhelp" in the sense that sovereign states unilaterally take
actions designed to protect their interests. In the context of
intellectual property, Section 301 is perhaps a leading
example of such self-help. In addition to high transaction
costs, self-help is inefficient to the extent that it creates
uncertainty and risk, both for the alleged offender and the
offended actor. Thus, there is a demand for international
regimes to increase levels of cooperation which would be
sub-optimal in the absence of such regimes."
For
intellectual property regulation, certainly the welldocumented failures of the pre-TRIPS system reflected the
important need for effective protection and enforcement.
Consequently, the demand by private industry for
institutional innovation at the international level appeared
justified and rational.
To overcome longstanding resistance to a new intellectual
property treaty, but more precisely to a new intellectual
property agreement under the GATT system, the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) anticipated the need for a
coalition of states working in cooperation to accomplish
shared, identifiable industry needs and goals." Industry
leaders were advised to collaborate with industry
representatives in the EC and Japan.79 The shared interest
in higher standards of intellectual property protection
facilitated coalition formation between these erstwhile
Indeed, a continuing source of irritation for U.S. trade partners is the
continued existence of Section 301. See WTO Panel Report on EC Complaint
Concerning Sections 301-310 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22,
1999) [hereinafter U.S. Sections 301-310].
"' Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for InternationalRegimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325,
332-45 (1982).
78 Of course, the United States had collaborated with other countries, primarily
Japan and the EC, in the pre-Uruguay Round efforts to bring intellectual property
within the GATT system. See Evans, supra note 23, at 158-59 (discussing attempts
to secure agreement on an anti-counterfeiting code proposed by the United States,
the EC, Canada, and Japan).
76

79

Id.
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competing industries. With their coordinated efforts, these
industries facilitated the formation of an intergovernmental
winning coalition for the TRIPS negotiations." At the very
early stages of the process leading to the Ministerial
Declaration at Punta del Este, several developed countries,
at the urging of their own private industries, agreed to join
the United States in promoting the inclusion of intellectual
property in the Round. Each state in the coalition was, in
turn, a member of a coalition consisting of its domestic
industries. The coalition that ultimately ensured the
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement was a combination of
sub-sets of coalitions of private industry and their
respective states.8
When the United States and the EC formed coalitions
with their intellectual property industries,82 the goal was to
"' To constitute a winning coalition, empirical analysis suggests that two criteria
must be satisfied. First, winning coalitions contain no more members than are
necessary to win and, second, they contain only members that adjoin (not necessarily
agree) on a one-dimensional policy scale. See ABRAM DE SWAAN & ROBERT M.
AXELROD, CONFLICT OF INTEREST: A THEORY OF DIVERGENT GOALS WITH
APPLICATIONS TO POLITICS 169-70 (1970). For a brief summary of the development
of coalition theories, see AD. M. A. VAN DEEMEN, COALITION FORMATION AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 1-6 (1997).
8' The United States and the EC are emphasized in this Article for a number of
reasons. It will aid the ease of the subsequent analysis and, more importantly, the
degree of convergence between industry and government objectives was greatest
with regard to these two parties.
12 It is possible to argue that the alliance between
state and industry is not
necessarily or strictly a coalitional form. For one thing, the two party nature of this
state/industry alliance may suggest that it is not susceptible to coalition theories
that assume multiparty settings. A coalition can be generally defined as cooperative
efforts to accomplish specific goals. Coalitions may be distinguished from other
cooperative efforts by their lack of formal structure because they are deliberately
constructed and the members are interactive. Yet these characteristics may be
found in other kinds of alliances to greater or lesser degree. Perhaps one critical
definitional element is that coalitions are formed not necessarily through
harmonious identification of objectives, but through trade-offs, linkages, or power.
In other words, coalitions are both about actor positions as well as issues. Put
differently, coalitions form over substantive positions on issues, as well as over the
fact of the issue. For example, in TRIPS negotiations, a coalition formed over the
issue of having the Round include intellectual property, and a counter coalition
opposed it. In neither of these coalitions was the policy or substance of TRIPS the
motivating cause of the coalition formation. Thus, with coalitions, it is possible that
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negotiate enforceable rules of intellectual property
protection that would bind developing countries.
The
outcome expected was not one that would bind these states
to a program of domestic policy reform,83 other than what
was explicitly negotiated."4 At its most basic level, the goal
of TRIPS was to seek to enforce standards that already
existed in other major intellectual property treaties.8 5 The
grand coalition, comprised of the state-industry coalitions
in the United States, the EC, and Japan, were
understandably of a cooperative model" given the initial
modest goal of the TRIPS negotiations. These countries
were already committed to the level of protection reflected
in the major intellectual property treaties. In this regard,
then, the policy differences in their national intellectual
property systems were irrelevant to the coalition
formation. 7 Consistent with power theories of coalition
formation,88 these trade partners disregarded their
respective differences in intellectual property until well into
the ambitious expansion of the initial objectives of the
the external coalition in fact reflects a diverse range of policy positions and members
are united through linkages, trade-offs and/or power. A pertinent example is the
industry coalition that formed in the United States, despite the fact that the
copyright industry and the patent industry had different views about the efficacy of
a trade-based agreement. See Ryan, supra note 49, at 561-62.
8 The TRIPS negotiating coalition could thus be described as policy blind.
14
In the end, TRIPS did require some changes in U.S. law. See, e.g., Harold C.
Wegner, TRIPS Boomerang-Obligations for Domestic Reform, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 535 passim (1996); Okediji, Fair Use Standard,supra note 21, at 105.
See also discussion infra Part II.
"5 Evans, supra note 23, at 137.
86 From
a social choice perspective, coalitions need not necessarily be
cooperative. They appear to have the characteristics of a cooperative game when the
focus is on what is likely to be obtained through a coalition as opposed to acting
alone.
87 This statement pertains to copyright policy in particular.
88 Power theories focus on how actors utilize information to overcome conflicts of
rational behavior. Some variations of power-based theories of coalition formation
identify the presence of a dominant player who controls the formation process and
chooses it. This variation on power-based coalition theory is also referred to as an
"actor-oriented" approach to coalition formation. See generally B. Peleg, Coalition
Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players, 10 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 11
(1981).
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negotiations.89 The expansion of the initial proposal for
TRIPS eventually drew attention to important differences
in the policies of developed countries.
Between 1986 and 1994, when the Round was concluded,
the TRIPS negotiations required just as much work in
reconciling areas of conflict between developed countries, as
in bargaining for developing country assent to the principle
of extending GATT to intellectual property. Indeed, a
careful analysis of the history of the negotiations suggests
that, in terms of its substance, the TRIPS Agreement was
primarily a product of concessions between the developed
countries.9 °
For the developing countries, once the
resistance to GATT as a forum was overcome," there were
fewer (even though contentious) issues to bargain around
and most of these involved patents in pharmaceuticals.92 In
general, the daunting task was that of determining the
scope of the proposed agreement and its relationship with
existing intellectual property treaties."
On the substantive front, significant progress began in
1990 when both the EC and the United States tabled
89 GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 15-25.
90

One might ask why the coalition of developed countries did not dissolve at this

point. An answer could be that the shared objective of heightened global protection
was still valued greater than the differences between them. A stronger explanation
would be based on the role of industry in these negotiations. If states, which are
responsible for policy, would have been willing to pull out as policy differences
became clear, certainly the industry, in whose primary interests the negotiations
were taking place, was not. So, industry groups working in concert across national
lines leaned heavily on their respective states that, in turn, made the necessary
compromises to stabilize their coalition. Thus strengthened, this coalition could face
developing countries and press for conclusion of the Agreement. See discussion
supranote 68.
9' Evans, supra note 23, at 159-216; GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 10, 18.
92 Evans, supra note 23, at 163-65; GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 25. The continued
debate over the scope of TRIPS provisions with regard to pharmaceuticals, especially
with the AIDS controversy in South Africa, and, more recently, the Anthrax scare in
the United States, provides a glimpse of the uncertain scope of TRIPS language and
the different views on the limits of unilateral determinations of what the provisions
mean.
93 See GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 13-18.
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similar draft Agreements, indicating the (coalition)
collaboration between these two dominant trade powers. 4
The two proposals provided the framework for the final
product, despite the emergence of policy-based differences
between developed countries and the continued resistance
of some developing countries to the principle and scope of
the proposals.
While the proposals submitted by
respective states generally fell within the categories of
"developed" and "developing" countries, the divisions were
neither that exact nor predictable. Indeed, over the period
of negotiations, the coalition formation between developed
countries altered as different issues arose. The same was
true for developing countries.96 Within these descriptive
categories, several different coalition configurations
emerged
with
some
countries
ostensibly
acting
97
independently.
In the end, the TRIPS Agreement was concluded by
adopting several strategies. The final agreement excluded
deal breakers (such as moral rights which the United

Id. at 15.
See, e.g., Evans, supra note 23, at 164-65. The author noted that support for
minimum standards, as opposed to complete harmonization, meant that countries
would have to ratify the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Works and
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. "Such a radical
proposal provoked controversy also among industrialized countries when the
proposed international standard differed from the level of protection offered within
their domestic legislation." Id. For example, with regard to protection terms for
neighboring rights, the United States supported a fifty-year term and the EC a
twenty-year term. Id.
96 For example, the Andean Group (Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) and
the Group of Ten (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru,
Tanzania, and Yugoslavia) focused on different issues at different stages of the
negotiations. The Group of Ten had early on opposed the idea of TRIPS while the
Andean Group was involved in making proposals at later stages of negotiations. See
GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 23; Ryan, supra note 49, at 562-63.
9' For example, Japan and Switzerland each submitted different proposals for a
draft agreement, and fourteen countries representing different development levels
joined together to submit a developing country proposal. These included Argentina,
China, Colombia, Cuba, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. See
14

95

GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 16.
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States opposed),98 included compromises (such as the rental
right provision which allowed Japan to maintain its length
of protection), and dealt creatively with unique issues (such
as distinct recognition of wines and spirits under
geographical indications to address a rift between the EC
and some wine producing countries). 99 Provisions intended
to acknowledge developing country concerns about the
Agreement as a whole were included, as reflected in the
transitional periods for developing and least developed
countries 00 and in the stated objectives of the Agreement.
At the same time, trade-offs in sector: particularly
important to the developing countries had also been
negotiated. In this way, the TRIPS Agreement guaranteed
a surplus for developed countries greater than what each
state could otherwise have obtained on its own, as well as a
surplus for developing countries in the form of enhanced
trade concessions in the areas of textiles and agriculture. It
remains to be seen whether such concessions will really be
implemented.
From an economic perspective, the TRIPS Agreement can
properly be viewed as a minimum set of standards because
it does represent the "core" of the game."' That is, no subset of the coalition could have obtained a better result than
the negotiations ultimately produced. Thus, in the process
of coalition formation, re-formation, and deal making, the
TRIPS Agreement produced an outcome that the market
may have produced through a bargaining process. With
every possible coalition receiving something better than it
would have if the deal were blocked completely, all the
possible outcomes indicated that an agreement on most
issues was better than none at all. Viewed as a core, the

9" See TRIPS Agreement art. 9.
9 See id. art. 23.
"0 See id. art. 24.
101

In game theory, the core represents the bargaining range of the game.

It

denotes the set of allocations that cannot be derailed by any coalition; further, better

deals cannot be made.
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level of protection in the different categories of intellectual
property protected by TRIPS may be described as an
efficient outcome; that is, every actor maximized its payoff
from successfully negotiating TRIPS.
The observation that a coalition of state and industry was
formed to "win" the TRIPS negotiation does not fully
answer the question why the United States acted in
coalition with the intellectual property industry and then
later with the EC given each sovereign's distinctive policy
interests in some intellectual property subjects and
sovereign priorities.
In other words, the study of a
particular coalition preference is analytically distinct from
what the coalition might accomplish. °2
Coalition preference is a social choice problem, while
coalition formation is intrinsically strategic, focusing
primarily on the outcomes made possible by the coalition."°3
An actor's coalition preference may determine the outcome
of the negotiation,' 4 so that in combining both the
preference for the outcome and the preference for the
coalition (as opposed to unilateral action) there has already
been an implicit signal suggesting the social choice made by
the actor. For example, in choosing to align with industry
and then, in turn, forming alliances with countries who
observed equal or higher levels of intellectual property
protection, strong intellectual property values were firmly
established in the coalitional strategy of developed
countries during the TRIPS negotiations. This was obvious
in the coalition preference adopted by the EC and the
United States during the TRIPS negotiations.
It could be argued that a public/private coalition was
necessary since international law recognizes only states as
102
103

VAN DEEMEN, supra note 80, at 7.
Id.

...See generally id. (using social choice theory and game theory to describe and

explain preferences for coalitions and to predict a set of coalitions that might
emerge).
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actors.
Consequently, government alliances with
intellectual property interest groups were inevitable if
industry voices were to be heard in an international setting.
However, other domestic constituents, notably libraries,
scientific and research institutes, and higher education
institutions were not represented in the negotiations and
did not form a part of the coalition.
The coalition
preference suggests that the governments' interests in
negotiating the TRIPS Agreement were more or less
consistent with those of industry. As many others have
observed, it was a capture of government and the process by
interest groups.
In the initial modest vision for the TRIPS Agreement, it
seems logical that the important domestic perspective
during the negotiations (and even in the pre-negotiation
stage) was the one that had the most direct interest in
preventing piracy and establishing a strong global regime
for innovators and owners of creative content. As to the
single issue of piracy, this harmonious coalition was
rational. However, when the TRIPS negotiations graduated
to a more ambitious scope, the original coalitional
preference remained unchanged. This may have been a
reflection of the growing influence of intellectual property
interest groups in the domestic front and the absence of any
countervailing lobbies to advocate a consumer interest
during the TRIPS negotiations. Or, it may reflect Riker's
size principle that "in social situations similar to n-person,
zero-sum games with side-payments, participants create
coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning
1 5 In either scenario, from a public choice
and no larger.""
perspective, the state's decision to form a coalition with
industry had immediate implications for domestic welfare.
The view of coalition formation that introduces player
preferences as a variable in the coalition formation

105

RIKER & ORDESHOOK, supra note 54, at 33, 47.
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process °6 predicts the possible coalition sets as a function of
a choice process." 7 While traditional game theory focuses
on player preferences in terms of the payoffs, this variation
introduces preferences for the coalition itself. Applied to
the TRIPS context, the state chose the industry as its
partner in the TRIPS negotiations as an indication of its
own allocative preferences. This view would be consistent
with the domestic rent-seeking activities of intellectual
property interest groups, and suggests that the coalition
formation between U.S. industries and the government
during the TRIPS negotiations reinforced domestic
government failure in the international arena.
From a policy perspective, the same analysis is not as
apposite to the EC. Intellectual property policy in the EC
has historically been more consistent with industry
demands for a maximalist interpretation of the rights
afforded to intellectual property owners. This is a reflection
not so much of strategic behavior, but of the philosophy of
intellectual property in the continental tradition. This
philosophy emphasizes individualism and the moral
integrity of human creativity over utilitarian justifications
for proprietary rights in creative goods.08
Thus, the
coalition that formed between the EC and its domestic
industry is more consistent with Riker's "harmonious
cooperation" which is defined as "a team effort against
nature, guided by a Platonic rule of justice. There is a joint
product which all participants' desire with equal intensity;
they agree about the appropriate means to obtain it.""°9 The
106
107
108

VAN DEEMEN, supra note 80, at 1-6.
See id. at 1-42.
But see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993

(1990) (arguing that the continental tradition has strong utilitarian roots).
109 Political scientist William Riker identifies a range of cooperative forms. At
one end lies the "harmonious" form of cooperation defined above. See Riker, supra
note 59, at 249. At the other end of the continuum lies a cooperative form that is
exploitative. It is one "in which goals are only partially shared. In this type of
cooperation... a winning coalition exercises the authority of the entire group to
support outcomes that, while perhaps benefiting the whole body, still benefit
especially the members of the winning coalition." Id.
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different approaches to intellectual property policy between
the EC-industry coalition, and the United States-industry
coalition, forecast an element of uncooperative behavior
that would
not fully manifest until the enforcement stage of
110
TRIPS.
The disparities between intellectual property policies of
developed countries were strategically obscured during the
TRIPS negotiations"' given the primary (and shared) goal
of strengthening rights in the global market. Yet, it is
these policies that provide an interpretive context for
national courts as they implement the rules of domestic
intellectual property laws." 2 Of course, the globalization of
the pharmaceutical industry, as with the copyright
industry, would have led ultimately to cooperative behavior
between developed countries on issues of interpretation of
TRIPS patent provisions.
The sharp divide between
developed
and
developing
countries
over
the
implementation of the Doha mandate on public health
reflects the power of an industry that transcends
nationality. The pre-TRIPS grid of protection based on
justifications for intellectual property rights between the
members of the grand coalition might be very simply
represented as follows:

110

As witnessed by the significance of the disputes between the two sovereigns.

See Part III.
.. Increasingly, scholars discount the difference between the droit d'auteur
system typified by continental French copyright laws and common law systems. See,
e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE

4(2001).
112 See W.R. Cornish, JudicialLegislation, in LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 359,

373 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997) (noting, in the British context, the historic
importance of preserving the "intervening role of national legislatures"); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global
Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 476 (2000) (arguing that national courts should serve
as agents for purposes of determining the unharmonized norms of the TRIPS
Agreement).
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Comparative pre-TRIPS levels of protection where * = profit

European Union

Greatest Scope of Protection

7*+l

United States

Optimal Scope of Protection

7t

Developing Countries

Least Protection

7[-1

Serious assessment of the welfare gains and losses in the
TRIPS Agreement can only take place in the context of its
negotiating history. To the extent that welfare gains are
influenced by domestic policy such an assessment must
account for how those policy objectives were advanced or
compromised. The coalitions engendered by the desire for
the successful negotiation of TRIPS might then be
presented with the resulting differences of anticipated
payoffs as follows:
Grand Coalition

Protection
Preference
Based on Domestic
Policy

TRIPS Payoff

Anticipated
Outcome

European Union +
Industry

3

Ir+1*

Harmonization
Up

European Union
Industries

3

71+1

Harmonization
Up

United States +
Industry

2

United States
Industries

3

7t+ gains from
domestic rentseeking + possible
rent in global and
domestic market
t+1

Harmonization

Harmonization
Up

Coalition models based on exogeneity, i.e., outcome driven. Protection = 1, 2, 3 (1* is
an arbitrary number to denote rent. It has no fixed value).

In an exogenous coalitional model, every incremental
coalition form increases the possible payoffs of a
multilateral agreement. Thus, by combining to form a firstlevel coalition, disparate intellectual property industries
increased the value of their TRIPS payoff. In second-level

856

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

coalitional

form (i.e.,

[Vol. 17

the combination of intellectual

property industries and state), the value of the payoff
increased with the probability of success. Recall from the
review of TRIPS negotiating history above that first- and
second-level coalitions were simultaneously formed in the
domestic setting of the various states that comprised the
coalition at the multilateral level. Thus, it was possible for
the members of the coalition, prior to the official
commencement of the TRIPS negotiations, to anticipate
moves and formulate strategies for the multilateral
negotiations.
Many commentators have observed that the TRIPS
Agreement as ultimately concluded is one in which "all
parties 'won' and 'lost' important issues.""3 However, what
was "won" or "lost" in this context is merely a reference to
what was politically feasible in a multilateral setting, given
the divergent range of issues and perspectives." 4 The
negotiations outgrew the original vision for curbing piracy
and extended to meet the specific interests of intellectual
property owners amid competing, if unacknowledged, policy
objectives.
The prospect that different policies of
intellectual property might yield different interpretations of
the TRIPS Agreement lends a description of the
negotiations as an n-game with an uncooperative
outcome."' The different domestic policies of members of
the developed country coalition also suggest that the payoff
function for each coalition member was premised on
113 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2313

(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter GATT URUGUAY ROUND]; GERVAIS,

supra note 51, at 16-24 (discussing the consultations and negotiations between the
several countries and the process of achieving compromise on differences). Dr.
Gervais, who was a member of the negotiating group stated, in describing the
negotiations at advanced stages, that with regard to important divisions between

developed countries and developing countries, informal consultations with individual
delegations or small sub-groups were established by the Chair of the TRIPS
negotiating group to identify "room to move." Id. at 19.
14 As Dr. Gervais describes it, by the end, "there were no options left." GERVAIS,
supra note 51, at 24.
15

This is exemplified by the lack of true harmonization between the countries.
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different values. While the concept of a core in game theory
typically assumes a cooperative game, the freedom of
players to join coalitions, form new ones, or break up
existing ones (as in the case of Peru as a member of both
the G-10 and the Andean Group), introduced forceful noncooperative elements to the game. It is for this very reason
that the core is another way of maximizing payoffs. The
members negotiated the best possible outcome based on
their identified payoff function.
Having earlier described the negotiated standards in
TRIPS as a core, it should also be said that the core will
leave some states with lower payoffs than others. Simply
put, an efficient outcome does not secure fairness or
Similarly, despite the general benefits of
equality.
international regimes some states will be worse off."6 An
efficient outcome does not correspond or equate with the
goals of distributive justice."7 It should be no wonder that
the
serious problems of public health in developing
countries is being addressed through the prism of a trade
regime, deploying intellectual property rules that are
intended to limit sovereign discretion over the range of
options available to address public welfare priorities.
Understanding the TRIPS Agreement as the outcome of
competitive bargaining is pertinent to the argument that
the state, in responding to industry demands and in effect
negotiating for the industry, compromised domestic policy
objectives-objectives that cannot be accomplished solely by
the market. Thus, even as a competitive model, the TRIPS
Agreement is flawed not only because as a normative
matter it is the product of political will as dictated by
116

Keohane, supra note 77, at 330, 332 (noting that voluntary decisions to create

regimes do not imply equality of situation or outcome).
.. Id. at 336 (discussing market failure as a basis for decisions by states to form
regimes; noting, however, that while each actor must be better off within the regime
than outside of it--otherwise there would be no demand for the regime-this does
not imply that formation of an international regime will yield overall welfare
benefits).
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private industry,"' but because only the sellers (content
industries) were involved in the coalitions. Public interest
objectives, typically represented by user groups such as
libraries, educational institutions, research institutes, or
non-governmental organizations were noticeably absent
Thus, the market for
during TRIPS negotiations.119
negotiating TRIPS was not strictly competitive and the
outcome should be scrutinized, particularly in the context of
a dispute, both for its claims of efficiency and its welfare
effects.
As noted earlier, the proposals of the EC and the United
States that formed the basic structure of the final TRIPS
Agreement suggested that there was collaboration between
the two actors.' 0 More specifically, there was collaboration
between relevant domestic industries of the two actors. 12 '
While the TRIPS negotiations ostensibly took place between
state actors, the driving force of the negotiations were
private actors, specifically intellectual property industries
118

As one author states:

The [TRIPS Agreement] clearly meets or exceeds the initial negotiating
mandate articulated in Uruguay in 1986 ....
Some industries are deeply
troubled by the compromise package .... Nonetheless, the opportunity to
obtain multilateral rules and enforcement mechanisms across so many
disparate issues will likely be viewed as one of the major accomplishments
[of the Round].
See GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 113, at 2313.
119 Based on the experience of the negotiations on WIPO internet treaties, it
seems likely that the TRIPS negotiations would have been infused with domestic
policy concerns that may have shaped the philosophy of the Agreement. Indeed, the
earliest indication of the importance of public participation in intellectual property
matters was the extensive public debate prior to U.S. adherence to the Berne
Convention.
The counterbalance that libraries, research foundations, and
educational institutions provided to the copyright industries was very important in
shaping the way in which the United States ratified the Berne Convention. Indeed,
from an international perspective, welfare enhancing doctrines such as fair use, and
the failure to provide explicitly for the protection of moral rights, all might be
attributed to the vigorous efforts of these domestic groups to resist the full force of
the continental copyright tradition and its effects on U.S. copyright law.
120 See Ryan, supra note 49, at 561-62.
11
See Evans, supra note 23, at 165 (commenting that the TRIPS negotiations
were characterized by an unprecedented involvement by private industry, which
promoted it, debated its contents, and assisted in drafting its provisions).
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and their associated lobbies. 2 As mentioned earlier, the
collaboration between the office of the USTR and
representatives of private industry, led to coalition efforts
in the EC. 123

The private industry groups were heavily

represented in Geneva'24 and their opinions, as supported or
modified by government negotiators, clearly defined the
basic contours of the TRIPS Agreement. Industry opinions
were important to the government representatives and, in
some cases, those opinions became official government
positions. 25 The degree to which these groups actually
controlled the outcome of the TRIPS negotiations likely
varied from country to country. What is clear, however, is
that the collaboration between government and industry
ensured that industry opinions weighed very significantly
in the positions put forth by the negotiators-particularly
given the fact that the industry groups worked in concert to
ensure that their own positions were reconcilable.

6

To

illustrate the significant role of private industry in the
negotiations, one account of the negotiating history of the
TRIPS Agreement identifies specific industry concerns over
what became known as the "Dunkel draft," and juxtaposes
122

Id. See also Ryan, supra note 49, at 558-67 (providing a brief but detailed

summary of the private/public U.S. alliance responsible for the idea of a traderelated agreement on intellectual property).
123 Id. at 562 (stating that the USTR believed that getting intellectual property on
the trade agenda would require European and Japanese support and recommending
that the industry representatives "get in touch" with their counterparts in those
countries to pressure their governments and EC secretariat leadership to support
the idea).
124 The United States was represented by interest groups such as
the Intellectual
Property Committee, the International Intellectual Property Alliance, and the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. European business was
represented by The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe,
while Japanese business was represented by the Japanese Federation of European
Organizations. See id. at 564-65.
125 See Evans, supra note 23, at 165-67 (detailing the extent of industry
participation in the negotiations).
126 In addition to working through government representatives,
the industry
groups also acted independently. In 1988, they introduced a draft agreement stating
the views of industry for a basic GATT framework for intellectual property. See id.
at 173.
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these private industry concerns with India's concerns with
the restrictions on compulsory licensing.127 In short, the
industry concerns were considered (and indeed were)
synonymous with the government positions. 128
The ascendant economic rationale of multilateral free
trade agreements is the classic game theory axiom that
cooperative bargaining yields the best outcome for all
parties.'29 The discipline of the international order is a
requisite for correcting government failures that stem from
domestic rent seeking activities, which typically generate
protectionist
trade
measures.
Enforcement
of
internationally negotiated rules is a critical part of this
system. Governments may recognize that compliance with
international standards enhance domestic welfare but may
be vulnerable to demands by other industries adversely
impacted by free trade agreements. The international
regime offers the opportunity for strategic allocation of
competence and enforcement of the welfare generating
rules without the negative political payoff that may result
from disaffected industries.! °
GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 25. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry was
concerned about the transitional period contained in the Dunkel draft for patents
and wanted immediate protection, while the motion picture industry wanted full
national treatment on private copying levies available in Europe for European
works. Additionally, the Motion Picture Association of America wanted the term
"author" to include corporations. Id. The emphasis on the pervasive reach of
developed country industries during the TRIPS negotiations is not intended to imply
that developing countries were not somewhat captive to their own domestic
industries. Indeed, the susceptibility of governments to their respective domestic
lobbies is, again, precisely the reason that this Article suggests that the dispute
settlement process should evaluate the welfare effects of arguments advocated by
governments rather than applying TRIPS provisions mechanically.
127

128

Id. (noting that the "United States ... submitted changes to the Dunkel draft

reflecting [its] (read 'industry') concerns," adding that representatives of the Motion
Picture Association of America "were working full time in Geneva during the last
weeks of the Round, at the end of 1993").
'2 See generally GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 113. Despite the general
acceptance of this premise, multilateral trade agreements are difficult to achieve.
The Uruguay Round was negotiated over a period of more than seven years.
130 The political gains of integration should not be underestimated in examining
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The TRIPS negotiations best reflect an uncooperative
game with a core that subverted the competitive
assumptions. This requires the existence of mechanisms to
correct imbalances that are attributed to the provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement. This can be done in the area of
TRIPS enforcement, by deferring to state policy, to the
extent that the policy seeks to preserve a balance between
owners and users, as well as owners and downstream
innovators, in efforts to promote public welfare. A domestic
balance that enhances welfare by maximizing both the
incentives to create and the opportunities to access
innovative goods is just as important for the domestic
economy as it is for the global one. In short, all countries
should be concerned about the domestic welfare balance in
intellectual property policies of other member states given
the interdependence of the global economic system. If the
TRIPS Agreement is enforced with a maximalist brush, the
welfare goals of domestic intellectual property will be
subverted, as will the welfare goals intrinsic to the
competitive trade model.
II. THE TWO STAGE GAME AND ITS WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
A. Multiple Players and Moves in the TRIPS Bargain
A standard claim by trade economists is that it is possible
to enjoy the economic gains of free trade without reciprocal
trade agreements. However, the same cannot be said for
the political and legal gains offered by international
regimes.'
These include, for example, prying open access
the utility of a particular international structure. See Okediji, Fair Use Standard,
supra note 21, at 85-87 (making a similar point with respect to the implications of
TRIPS on the U.S. fair use doctrine).
"' ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

36-37 (1997) (outlining the economic, political, and legal functions of trade
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to foreign markets, increasing domestic political support for
liberal trade, rationalizing various foreign policy
objectives, 11 2 and promoting legal security. 3 ' Consequently,
the design choice of the international organization and the
particular mix of rules and standards articulated in the
agreement are useful criteria for evaluating what the state
intended/negotiated in establishing the dispute settlement
regime of a particular legal discipline.'
In an integrated market, intellectual property rights
owners are united by their joint desire to maximize gains
from the exclusive proprietary rights and the resulting
market power that intellectual property protection
affords. 3 ' States are expedient agents to assist these
citizens in accomplishing this goal in the international
setting. However, securing the public policy and welfare
objectives for having an intellectual property system is also
the responsibility of the state. In the utilitarian American
tradition, social welfare is accomplished by a careful
calibration of rights and limitations. In the continental
tradition with its emphasis on natural rights, the social
welfare function 3 s is reflected in the policy ideal underlying
liberalization). Also, it is possible to have a regime without an international
agreement. See Keohane, supra note 77, at 337-39 (distinguishing between the
demand for agreements and the demand for regimes).
132 See Keohane, supra note 77, at 334.
Keohane discusses the concept of
"nesting," which is the placing of specific agreements within more comprehensive
agreements. See id. International regimes help to make governments' expectations
consistent with one another. For example, bilateral tariff agreements are not made
on an ad hoc basis but are affected by the GATT rules. Id.
113 Regimes
based on explicit agreements reduce information costs, thus
satisfying one of the tests for international market failure justifying the need for
regimes to introduce efficiency to the international system. Id. at 337-41.
134 See generally Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13.
...This desire to maximize gains is evident in the alliances that were formed to
influence respective governments to initiate the TRIPS negotiation in the first place.
See Ryan, supra note 49, at 561-66.
136 An Arrowian social welfare function is a rule used to produce social values, but
it is not the social value itself. Herein begins the difficulty of copyright
harmonization, particularly as considered in the context of international trade law.
It is possible that, in the copyright tradition, the aggregate rules constitute a social
welfare function because they are designed to produce socially desirable outcomes
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the rights. Thus, although the desire for rent may force a
coalition between industries in these respective traditions,
it is the state that chooses the conditions under which
welfare objectives will be maximized.137 To analyze the
competing functions of the state in its capacity as domestic
social welfare planner, international negotiator, and
enforcer of negotiated rules, it is useful to view the TRIPS
negotiations as a two-stage, infinitely repeated game.'38
In the first stage of negotiating the TRIPS Agreement,
developed countries played against developing countries
with a pre-commitment to accomplish the stated objective of
an enforceable regime of heightened intellectual property
protection. This pre-commitment between the EC and the
United States, in particular, yielded a dominant strategy
based on robust information sharing between developed
countries about standards on which they could agree.139
This first stage had decidedly different objectives than the
overall game, which can be called "intellectual property
globalization." At this stage, the prisoner's dilemma that is
characteristic of international relations was resolved
because the same choices yielded the optimal outcome for
each developed country even without the information
sharing. In game theory terms, the decision to work
namely, enhanced public welfare by encouraging optimal levels of productivity and
optimal levels of access to the work by the public. In the continental tradition,
however, the rules are best understood as the values. This would be represented in
economic terms as a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. As employed in
Paretian welfare economics, this type of social welfare function is a depiction of
choice among social states based on a value judgment. Thus, despite similarities in
rights and the influence of economic forces on both traditions, the choice by states to
follow a utilitarian path or a natural rights path is a welfare choice and not, merely
or only, a reflection of cultural differences.
17 International agreements are between states. The state is responsible for
enforcing TRIPS within its domestic borders.
138 See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic
of Two Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (describing domestic politics and
international relations as a two stage game).
139 See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345,
345-47, 381-88 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards].
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together for an intellectual property treaty was a dominant
strategy for major exporters of intellectual goods.
The first stage, however, is still more complex. Within
the group of countries working in cooperation, there were
coalitions working to ensure the outcome of the dominant
strategy. 140 Recall that coalition formation, an aspect of
game theory, has been used primarily to examine political
outcomes. Given the nature of the international process
where traditionally only state actors are recognized, and
the particular features of transnational intellectual
property alliances that have the ability to influence foreign
policy and serve as powerful domestic lobbies, coalition
formation again provides a uniquely adaptable lens to
examine the social choices made during the first stage of
TRIPS negotiations. Public choice also offers some insight
in its continuum of forms of cooperation with extremes at
either end.'4 ' At one end is a game where the players jointly
want the same outcome with the same amount of passion or
intensity and agree on the best means to obtain the
outcome. 4 1 At the other end is cooperation that flows from
goals that are partially shared. In this form of cooperation,
a winning coalition "exercises the authority of the entire
group to support outcomes that, while perhaps benefiting
the whole body, especially still benefit the members of the
winning coalition. ,1
The beneficiaries of heightened intellectual property rules
are first and foremost intellectual property owners and
then, less directly, states. While there may be overlap
between the interests of both actors, these shared interests
are not entirely congruent."' Intellectual property owners
generally are concerned only about obtaining maximum
140
141
142

GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 19-25; Evans, supra note 23, at 169-75.
See Riker, supra note 59, at 247, 249.
See id. at 249.

Id. (referring to cooperative forms as "exploitative" as opposed to
"harmonious").
144 See supra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text
(discussing shared interests).
143
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gains from enforcement of intellectual property rights. As
private actors, they are self-serving with no public
obligation or incentive to act any differently. 141 States, on
the other hand, must account for a variety of interests,
some of which may be in direct competition with the
interests of intellectual property owners. As such, a state is
an arbiter of conflicting goals, as well as a champion of the
interest that Succeeds in winning over others. 14' However,
in coalition form, the state's ability to function as a neutral
arbiter for the domestic market is constrained because the
TRIPS Agreement assumes a significantly integrated
market. This might be presented as follows:
Actor

Desired returns from
the Global Market

United States

7E+1,2 ....
n

Industry

7E+1,2 ....n

Desired returns from
the Domestic Market

7t+1

The table depicts a divergence of interests at the domestic level, i.e., an endogeneity
problem. The difference is represented as a + 1 - n = 1.

The value "1' represents economic rent over and above
normal profits, defined as the minimum necessary to keep a
producer involved in that line of production. With respect
to intellectual property, this would correspond to optimal
levels of protection. 7c is realized at a level of optimal
protection of innovative goods that requires a balance of
competing interests. Because the state determines those
rights through intellectual property policy and legislation,
the state controls the value of"1."

141
146

Public perception might relax this assumption.
Ryan, supra note 49, at 541 (noting that the strategic interaction of states in

multilateral negotiations is "really a two-level game in which states bargain with
their own domestic groups even as they bargain with each other").
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The absence of direct application of the TRIPS Agreement
in most countries 47 suggests that the state distinguishes
between its political market and its economic market. This
distinction is under tremendous pressure with regard to
TRIPS enforcement because of the growing tension between
the welfare goals of intellectual property policy and the
political dominance of domestic intellectual property
interest groups. Ideally, in a purely competitive market,
the state would want marginal cost to equal marginal
revenue and price (mc = mp = p). However, industry would

want price to be greater than the profit maximizing criteria
(i.e., p > mc = mr). In the domestic market, this divergence
is manageable. In the global market, however, there is a
confluence of state and industry interest. Consequently, in
the enforcement stage of TRIPS, the state must make an
allocative decision about whether it will act as a social
welfare planner. nt will be realized if, and only if, the state
implements and a dispute panel interpret TRIPS in a
manner that balances the interests of consumers and
owners in the domestic market of the allegedly breaching
state. Rent, i.e., it + 1, is also determined by the state or a
dispute resolution body. Recourse to a supranational forum
is a convenient strategy for a state that aligns with a
particular sector, but does so outside of the controls of the
domestic socio-political system and yet is obligated to
enforce the international outcome within that same system.
A distinguishing characteristic of two stage games is that
the players are able to anticipate the moves at the second
stage of the game. It is possible that the manipulative use
of the dispute settlement process to further harmonize
intellectual property norms sub-rosa was precisely what
developed countries anticipated in the enforcement stage of
the TRIPS Agreement. If this is the case, there would be
little incentive to refuse to comply with the decisions of the
dispute panels, as compliance would secure the payoffs
"' In other words, most countries required domestic implementing legislation for
TRIPS to have domestic legal force.
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calculated at the stage one game negotiations. Recall,
however, that the separation of powers in the domestic
political market calls for a bargain between the executive
and the legislature prior to negotiating an international
agreement. Where such a bargain has been made there is,
in theory, less possibility that the legislature will balk at
the decision of a tribunal that is consistent with the
negotiated terms of the treaty.14 s Alternatively, where the
dispute resolution yields a decision that is consistent with
legislative interests, compliance is also predictable unless
other domestic variables disrupt the equilibrium. 9 Thus,
where there is some uncertainty about how the domestic
political market will react to a legislative move toward
deeper harmonization of intellectual property, the
international dispute settlement process offers an avenue
for both industry and the government to accomplish
preferred objectives with the shield of treaty obligation
mitigating potential political costs of compliance.
In the Uruguay Round, intellectual property was a clear
winner, at least in the sense that other new topics such as
investment and services yielded only very modest
148

It should also be noted that cooperation between the executive and legislature

plays an important role in international affairs. It is important that the Executive
be taken seriously in international negotiations otherwise other nations will be less
inclined to cooperate with the United States. The balance between executive
freedom under the Treaty power and executive constraints under the practice of
implementing legislation is a factor to be considered in choosing strategies for
international negotiations. See generally Putnam, supra note 138. As the Supreme
Court has expressed:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be
avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which
is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
149 One possible disruption could come from the Supreme Court, whose role
cannot be precisely accounted for in the equilibrium calculus. The Supreme Court
represents a "state of nature" in the game theoretic sense. Its potential effect is
uncertain but potentially very disruptive.
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agreements. 5 ' A coalition of intellectual property alliances
and state actors engaged in cooperative strategies15 1 to
motivate negotiations for an agreement that should
enhance global welfare 5 and provide unprecedented
protection for owners, such as the TRIPS Agreement. But
what did it mean to win in this context? To answer this
question, a related economic theory, social choice, will be
examined.
B. Social Choice, Coalitions,and TRIPS
Social choice theory is a tool both for critique and
design. 5 3 Game theory is a useful predictive tool, but as
indicated earlier, it is insufficient to address issues of
whether the outcome is just, optimal, or fair. Social choice
theory facilitates this particular project. It offers some
important normative insights into how to evaluate the
outcomes of strategic bargaining. Although the argument is
that trade is good for all, countries negotiate only for what
is good for themselves. Thus, for example, where a country
is interested only in consumer surplus and a domestic firm's
profit in the internal market, participation in a multilateral
system is sub-optimal for that country.
Autarchy is
150 See
151 See

Ryan, supra note 49, at 567 (making the same point).
Alexander A. Caviedes,

International Copyright Law:

Should the

European Union Dictate Its Development? 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 165, 187-90 (1998)
(tracing the origin of TRIPS negotiations to the U.S. private sector); Ryan, supra
note 49, at 557-66 (providing the background of the dominant role of private
industry in initiating, guiding, and shaping the TRIPS negotiations).
...There has been significant support for the proposition that minimum
enforceable standards of intellectual property protection enhances public welfare by
securing the gains of comparative advantages in production of knowledge goods, in
promoting development goals, encouraging FDI flows, and protecting investments in
innovation. See generally Reichman, From Free Riders to FairFollowers, supra note
26; KEITH MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(2000).
1"' See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2 (1963).
See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Current Developments in the Theory of Social
Choice, 44 SOC. RES. 607 (1977).
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optimal."" Interdependence and the incentive to engage in
multilateral bargaining flows from the fact that countries
are, in fact, concerned about internalizing a firm's profit
from foreign countries.
Nonetheless a social welfare
function, such as domestic welfare, consisting of an
aggregate of internal pressures, such as lobbying patterns,
domestic policy, etc., creates an incentive to deviate from
the multilateral agreement when participation might
otherwise erode domestic welfare benefits. Such deviation
need not necessarily be a retreat from treaty membership
but might be resolved in other strategic ways, such as
government-to-government
undertakins,6 55
mediation,
K
initiatives.
public-private
or
negotiations,
Backward inductive analysis reveals another set of
interesting findings about TRIPS enforcement. Backward
induction requires that the stage two game of TRIPS
enforcement be solved first to reveal what strategies should
be employed at the negotiations. If at the stage two game,
the payoff function changes from maximalist to optimal
levels of protection, either due to strong pro-consumer, procompetitive domestic pressure, a change in administration,
or other factors, then the rational choice is deviation from
the TRIPS dispute decision. If deviation is rational at stage
two, then only the payoff function at the stage one game
should drive the level of compromise made.
The identified payoff function during the negotiations was
that developing countries would join TRIPS. If developing
countries did in fact join TRIPS, but for reasons unrelated
to intellectual property interests, such as concessions in
other areas of trade, it suggests that the deployment of a
supranational dispute settlement process as to disputes
between developed countries is an unnecessary cost in
15

Ines

ECONOMICA
155
156

Macho-Stadler

161, 169 (1998).

et al., Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements, 65

See Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 463-67.
Id. at 467-69. This approach would be equally effective in disputes between

developed countries.
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terms of sovereign discretion, but not so for industry. Since
industries in all developed countries seek rent from both
domestic and international markets, the WTO dispute
settlement process is exactly what was needed to facilitate
rent seeking in the domestic market where the state is
either less inclined or faces political hurdles to satisfy
industry demands. One can conclude that the industry
correctly identified its payoff function when it formed the
coalition with the state at the stage one game. To the
extent that the governments may now be reluctant to
submit to the dictates of a supranational body it suggests
on the other hand that the state did not accurately calculate
its payoff function or anticipate that the payoff function
might change in the stage two game.
The influence of intellectual property lobbies in the EC
and United States has proven potent and there is currently
no evidence that this situation will change in the
foreseeable future. It is also still the case that intellectual
property industries generate significant income flows to the
domestic economy, thus the motive behind global
enforcement remains just as strong today. Consequently,
wholesale retreat from the TRIPS Agreement is unlikely
given the side-payments that have already occurred and the
global payoffs anticipated. More importantly, if developing
countries will enforce the TRIPS Agreement because they
have received concessions in other trade areas or due to a
threat of invoking the DSU process, then there is really no
incentive for developed countries to heed demands for a
development-oriented TRIPS jurisprudence, in any area,
including public health.
Indeed, the basic goal of
introducing intellectual property in the multilateral trade
regime would have been fulfilled.
For developed countries, then, it is possible to obtain the
benefits of the TRIPS Agreement with regard to
enforcement in developing countries, without complying
with dispute settlement decisions that would subvert the
welfare objectives of their own domestic intellectual
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property policy. There are, however, other costs associated
with this strategy, including reputational costs in
international circles and the loss of good faith with trading
partners. Further, if deviation is a rational choice for a
developed country, it suggests that the payoff function in
the stage one game did not factor the value of relationships
with other countries-but it must do so now in the stage
two game. The essential question becomes: is there room to
maintain policy driven domestic laws that may be in
tension or inconsistent with a panel's interpretation of
TRIPS obligations? This question can be answered in the
affirmative if the dispute resolution system is viewed as a
means to assist states in fulfilling their specific
constitutional mandate in the area of intellectual property.
It requires that TRIPS dispute panels defer more
substantively to the domestic policy arguments of states. In
the trade setting, the degree to which a dispute panel is
influenced by domestic policy rationale makes the outcome
of the dispute suspect to power plays of the type witnessed
in the pre-WTO era. Thus, to address this concern, several
variables might be considered.
First, deference to policy arguments should be
considerable primarily in respect of interpretation of TRIPS
standards. In other words, for those rules specified in
TRIPS-for example, that patent protection should last for
twenty years from date of filing-deference should be
minimal and the domestic policy at stake must be
compelling to warrant such deference. Second, a dispute
panel might employ a balancing test to determine whether
a redressable violation has occurred. Such a test would
comprise a determination of whether the asserted policy
basis for the challenged law is in reality a non-tariff barrier
to trade in intellectual property goods. Consistent with
GATT jurisprudence, the focus of the inquiry would not be
on the specific operation of the practice, rule, or policy, but
on the normative and prescriptive rationale. A practical
step in the analysis would be whether a less trade distortive
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option is available to the state. This step would allow the
TRIPS panel to view the policy measure in light of the
broad principles in the TRIPS preambular statement,
particularly the explicit acknowledgment of the public
policy objectives of national
systems for the protection of
157
intellectual property.

The second stage of the game, the application and
enforcement of TRIPS, clearly raises a different set of
concerns. Because the rules and payoffs in this stage
pertain to enforcement against each other, as well as
against developing countries, it is not yet clear what the
dominant strategy will be. At this stage, the coordination
game structure that produced the TRIPS Agreement
disintegrates and formerly cooperative coalitions may be
158
realigned as competing actors (i.e., state versus industry).
Their different interests and goals are more clearly
discernible in stage two, as are the differences in TRIPS
interpretations between and among states.
Part III
examines these differences as highlighted in the dispute
settlement process.
III. BOUNDARIES OF SOVEREIGN DISCRETION:

THE ROLE OF THE

DSU

A. Reflections on TRIPS: Thoughts from InternationalLaw and
InternationalRelations Theory

The assimilation of intellectual property into the
international trade regime was greeted with considerable
approbation in the United States and other developed
1' See TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
1. Macho-Stadler et al., supra note 154, at 161 (noting that "sometimes
cooperative opportunities are not realized because coalition arrangements that are
possible in multilateral negotiations undermine the stability of the general
agreements").

2003]

PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO

873

countries. Indeed, the extensive academic literature on the
TRIPS Agreement generally assumes the efficacy and
probity of intellectual property as a subject of international
economic regulation.'59 The TRIPS Agreement, however, is
not the result of a precipitate enlightenment about the
correlation of comparative advantage and the increased
susceptibility of knowledge goods to appropriation in an
integrated global market.
Nor was the enthusiasm
engendered by the successful negotiation of TRIPS a
reflection of an unprecedented appreciation for the utility of
a global intellectual

property system. 160

The TRIPS

Agreement, with its celebrated substantive provisions for
intellectual property protection, is preeminent principally
because of the enforcement mechanism assured by the DSU
administered by the WTO."'
The DSU replaces the
mercurial dispute settlement system 2 of GATT with a new
"' For analyses of the integration of trade and intellectual property, see
generally GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989); J.
H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks
of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747 (1989). For early assessment
of the importance of multilateral responses to intellectual property protection, see
Marshall Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a
New Multilateralism,76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991); Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting
First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the
GATT MultilateralFramework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989). But see Gana
Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare, supra note 40, at 125-72 (arguing against the
notion of a "natural" fit for intellectual property in the multilateral trade system).
'60 Efforts to establish an effective international system for copyright and patent
protection date back to 1883. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, chs. 1, 2 & 3 (1987)
(describing the origins of the Berne Convention); Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A
Reevaluation of the International Patent Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
765, 766-76 (1947).
For the purposes of this Article, intellectual property
globalization is used to denote the progressive development of uniform, standardized
intellectual property rights as TRIPS is construed and enforced by a supranational
institution. The indices of the globalization of intellectual property vary from the
increasing reliance by scholars on provisions of TRIPS to assess the validity of
domestic legislative initiatives to a rash of legislative activity in Congress based on
developments in other countries.
See DSU.
162 See generally Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New
World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095 (1994);
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order specifically designed to address the deficiencies of the
pre-WTO era.1"
The DSU, however, does more than
rehabilitate the pre-WTO rules. It is, by most accounts, a
"premium package" bargain with highlights that include:
the establishment of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to
administer the rules and procedures of the DSU;"'
procedures for multiple complainants 65 and third parties
having a "substantial interest" in the disputed issue;'66
establishment

of a

standing

Appellate

Body;6

7

and

surveillance of the implementation of the decisions of the
dispute panels by member states. 1 8 The DSU also provides

for "expeditious arbitration" by mutual agreement of the
parties as an alternative to the multilateral process.'69 In
short, dispute settlement under the WTO seems replete
with the accouterments of mature legal
systems, including
1 7
the establishment of a legal aid center.

Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Settling Disputes in the GATT: The Past,Present
and Future, 24 INT'L LAW. 519 (1990). For specific treatment of the new WTO
dispute treatment in relation to TRIPS disputes, see generally Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Andrea F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).
'6'See generally William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 51 (1987) (discussing dispute settlement in GATT as more of a process in
consensus building rather than dispute settlement). For a leading examination on
the GATT dispute settlement process, its roots in diplomacy, and the influence of
diplomatic process on dispute resolution, see generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990); ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).
164 See DSU art.
2.
1'6 See id. art 9.
"'
See id. art. 10.
See id. art. 17.
168 See id. art. 21.
"9 See id. art. 25. This process was invoked, for the first time, in the complaint
by the EC against the United States over Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act. See
110(5) Panel Report, supra note 32. For an analysis of the use of arbitration in the
Section 110(5) case, see Okediji, Rules of Power in an Age of Law, supra note 5.
,70The Advisory Centre for WTO Law, the first of its kind in the international
legal system, is meant to assist developing and least-developed countries in dealing
with WTO related disputes "with a view to combating the unequal possibilities of
access to international justice as between States." See Director-General Mike
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A strong, if implicit, presumption underlying the
ambitious posture of developed countries, particularly the
United States, during TRIPS negotiations was that
enforcement of TRIPS obligations primarily would
externalize the domestic status quo.
Enforcement of
intellectual property rules pursuant to the TRIPS
Agreement would reinforce domestic interests, not change
them, legitimize and invigorate the basic norms that
undergird domestic intellectual property policy, and
facilitate the extension of these norms to other countries.
Indeed, there was substantial basis for this assumption: the
TRIPS Agreement was initiated by private industry171 and,
as concluded, required minimal changes to U.S. intellectual
property law.172
Undoubtedly, however, intellectual property law is
unavoidably "international."
Scholars increasingly are
turning to texts of international treaties to assess the
validity of domestic initiatives and scholarly proposals for
intellectual property policy.'73 Put more starkly, recent
Moore, Address at the Official Opening of the Advisory Centre for WTO Law (Oct. 5,
2001) at www.wto.org/english/news-e/spmm-e/spmm7l-e.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2003). The Centre opened on October 5, 2001 under the leadership of former GATT
and WTO legal advisor Frieder Roessler.
"' See Ryan, supra note 49, at 561-66.
172 See Dinwoodie, Integration, supra note 61, at 307
(noting that significant U.S.
influence on intellectual property treaties has resulted in minimal changes to U.S.
law). As a matter of fact, several TRIPS provisions were directly influenced by U.S.
legislation. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 27(1) n.5 (explicit reference to American
terminology). Evidence of U.S. influence in the choice of words in the TRIPS
Agreement is particularly evident in the enforcement provisions. Compare TRIPS
arts. 44-46 (injunctions, damages and other remedies), with 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505
(injunctions).
173 This is a gloss on what is a significant debate in international
(trade) law,
namely, the question of subsidiarity. In other words, what competencies are
reserved to a state and which are delegated to an international organization? What
are the tools for making this determination? What are the determinants of a
legitimate division of competencies? See generally George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory
Competition, Externalization,and Jurisdiction,34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993). See
also Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 334-35 (1999). The
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legislative activity174 and government proposals evaluating
domestic law175 demonstrate that there is less and less that
is "domestic" about domestic intellectual property law.
Despite the current political reality of intellectual
property lawmaking, there remain enduring asymmetries
between
intellectual
property law resulting from
adjudication in international fora and domestic intellectual
property policy.176 As a normative issue, this result might
be expected.
The incomplete harmonization
of
international intellectual property may reflect the
subsidiarity (or competency) problem and what Professor Trachtman describes as an
"interstitial" problem-where within an institution power should be exercised-both
entail questions of constitutional legitimacy and the relationship between domestic
and international law. Id. at 335.
174 These laws were proposed and passed in the style of the new international era,
namely, in response to legislation enactments abroad, most typically in the
European Union. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending the copyright term to life plus seventy
years in response to the EU Term Directive); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (implementing the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
For a detailed account of the international negotiations that led to the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, see Samuelson, supra note 23.
175 See generally The Library of Congress, U.S. Copyright Office, A Report of the
Register of Copyrights Pursuant to §104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
(Aug. 2001), available at http://www.loc.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca-study.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2003). Section 104 of the DMCA directs the Register of
Copyrights to examine the effects of the DMCA on the development of electronic
commerce and associated technology on the operation of sections 109 and 117 of the
Copyright Act. The Report suggests that recognition of a first sale doctrine would
place the United States in a different position relative to what international
partners are doing. See generally id.
176 This is a gloss on what is a significant debate
in international (trade) law,
namely, the question of subsidiarity. In other words, what competencies are
reserved to a state and which are delegated to an international organization? What
are the tools for making this determination? What are the determinants of a
legitimate division of competencies? See generally George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Joel P. Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory
Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993). See
also Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 334-35 (1999). The
subsidiarity (or competency) problem and what Professor Trachtman describes as an
"interstitial" problem-where within an institution power should be exercised-both
entail questions of constitutional legitimacy and the relationship between domestic
and international law. Id. at 335.
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deliberate allocation of powers between the domestic and
international systems. 7 Put differently, the domain of
WTO adjudication, at least in theory, ought to be
distinguishable from domestic policy initiatives, given the
divergent responsibilities of governance at national and
international levels.'78 Stated positively, the areas of
incomplete harmonization reflect points where the
legitimacy of undertakings may be questioned within the
domestic constitutional structure, or where other political
realities (whether based on interest group politics or
sectoral divisions) inflate the costs of a bargain.'79 Yet by
virtue of its design choice,' the WTO, while necessarily
' Or that the cost of harmonization, by way of a legal rule, proved too high.
Incomplete harmonization may be reflected through the use of standards to be
construed by a dispute settlement body, or by lacunae in the treaty. See Trachtman,
WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 334.
178 The manner in which these responsibilities are constructed depend on what
view of the state one subscribes. For a simple description of the influence of political
philosophy-Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian concepts of government-on domestic
implementation of international regulations, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE
GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 16-26 (1997) [hereinafter PETERSMANN,

GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM]. While neither Hobbes nor Locke dealt
much with international law, their views on the function of the state is significant
for understanding justifications for international law, while also providing useful
tools to rationalize the role of the state vis vis the international legal system.
179 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 162, at 333 (noting that minimum
standards suggest an agreement to disagree about the optimal level of protection).
See also Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 455, 460
(noting U.S. failure to consider the degree to which political circles might be willing
to endure countervailing costs of trade concessions given in return for higher levels
of intellectual property protection; observing that "governments compromised far
more, and obtained far less" in TRIPS than has been admitted).
"0 The creation of the WTO is a significant development in the evolution of
international organizations. The WTO is the first international organization with
broad jurisdictional authority over a wide variety of subjects ranging from trade in
goods to financial services and intellectual property. Expansion of the WTO's
portfolio to include subjects such as investment and competition law is still being
debated. The mandatory nature of the obligations in the agreements monitored by
the WTO and the dispute settlement mechanism that enforces compliance indicate
that a significant degree of sovereignty has been ceded to the WTO in those areas
that fall within its jurisdictional scope. However, to the extent that the decisions of
a dispute panel are not directly and automatically integrated into a member's
domestic legal system, one might argue that sovereignty loss is minimal. See, e.g.,

878

sensitive,

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

is not beholden to the political, cultural and

legal norms that sustain the (intellectual property) laws of
its member states.'
Indeed, in several instances, dispute
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution
Regimes in InternationalTrade Organizations,20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 759-60, 76263 (1999) (categorizing the WTO as an International Adjudication regime and
suggesting that the lack of standing by private parties and the absence of direct
effect of adjudicate decisions minimize the cessation of sovereignty to the WTO;
arguing that such a regime will likely be more palatable to democracies because it is
a rule-oriented regime). But see PETERSMANN, GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM, supra note 178, at 21. Id.
' See TRIPS Agreement pmbl. (providing, inter alia, that member states
recognize "the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the
protection of intellectual property").
182 This has been true in "pure" trade disputes and is now extended to TRIPS
disputes. See, e.g., WTO Panel Report on U.S. Requests Concerning Canada's
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R (March 14, 1997); WTO
Appellate Body Report on U.S. and Canadian Appeal Concerning Canada's Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997). The Appellate
Body held that Canada's attempt to preserve an indigenous periodical industry by
utilizing a combination of import prohibitions, favorable postal rates, and tax
advantages constituted a violation of GATT Article III. See generally Myra Tawfik,
Competing Cultures: Canada and the World Trade Organization-TheLessons from
Sports Illustrated,in THE CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (1998)

(analyzing the WTO decision in terms of its implication for the development of
distinct national cultural identities). Professor Tawfik argues that the objectives of
the WTO are fundamentally incompatible with "the ability of a sovereign nation to
have unfettered discretion to determine by itself the means by which it implements
its cultural policies." Id. at 283. The international trade system is, however,
structured precisely to impose different levels of constraints on policy options of
member states. Indeed, this is the only way the system, such as it is, can exist and
be effective. See generally JACKSON, supra note 30. See also U.S. v. India Panel
Report, supra note 14. The Appellate Body held that "administrative instructions"
by which India implemented Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement were
inconsistent with the obligations of that provision notwithstanding the fact that
Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "Members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this agreement
within their own legal system and practice."
India maintained that the
administrative instructions were legally binding under Indian law but neither the
Panel nor the Appellate body was persuaded by the argument. The Appellate Body
held that WTO dispute bodies can legitimately interpret a member state's laws to
see if they meet the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at 25, paras. 65-67.
See generally Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 11, at 585-601. Some
scholars have urged that the WTO dispute resolution process defer, in some cases, to
domestic norms in interpreting the reach of TRIPS obligations. See, e.g., Dreyfuss &
Lowenfeld, supra note 162, at 301-07. Such deference might, for example, legitimize
and strengthen the dispute settlement system by allaying fears about the erosion of
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bodies have explicitly declined to accept arguments or
interpretations rationalized primarily, or only, by domestic
policy interests.183
The dynamic, yet unpredictable,
interaction between international intellectual property laws
as construed by the WTO, and the laws of member states,
provides the framework within which the development of
domestic and international intellectual property policy will
unfold.
As stated earlier, it has been useful for scholars in a
variety of disciplines to evaluate the international and
national fields as distinct markets. 84
However,
globalization typically denotes the accelerated integration
of these two markets, facilitated by rapid information flows
and unprecedented technological developments. 85
The
objectives of harmonized laws, intellectual property and
otherwise, are prescribed responses to the challenges of an
integrated global economy. States are no longer the onesovereignty that were particularly strong at the inception of the WTO regime while
also preserving some flexibility for states to tailor their own intellectual property
policy consistent with specific economic, cultural and legal contexts and needs.
...See, e.g., U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14; Canada-Patent Protection,
supra note 26; 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 32.
1'4 See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 1 (2000) (analysis
of democracy as competitive). See generally Keohane, supra note 77. See also
DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY How IDEAS SHAPED MODERN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4 (2001) (noting the treatment of "politics between

borders and politics between polities are two sorts of realms with two sorts of
habits").
1"5

MARTIN SHAW, THEORY OF THE GLOBAL STATE: GLOBALITY AS AN UNFINISHED

REVOLUTION 2-7 (2000) (describing globalization as a third narrative of change in
the international realm. The first two are post-modernity and post-cold war world).
He argues that:
[G]lobalization became dominant once the political transition [of the postcold war world] ceased to impress, and the most pervasive forms of change
appeared to be located in the expansion of market relations, ubiquitous
commodification and the communications revolution that mediated them.
The global remained largely undefined, however, because the content of
globalization seemed little more than a speeding up of the marketization of
the previous, neo-liberal decade. The global meant principally, it seemed,
the negation of the national boundaries which had defined the old order; it
did not have a core meaning of its own.
Id. at 6.
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dimensional predominant actors in international relations.
Instead, markets and market actors propel the direction of
international norms and rules. 8 ' It is not so much that
state power/authority is diminished per se, as some have
suggested is characteristic of globalization, 18

7

as that it is

being exerted in directions dictated primarily by private
88
economic transactions and at an unprecedented pace.1
Further (or as a consequence), the state and private
industries that dominate the globalization process
collaborate in greater concert than previous milieus of
international law and international relations could have
foreseen or facilitated.'89 With such coordinated objectives,
the state in the international context tends to represent the
186

See Jeff Gerth, Where Business Rules: Forging Global Regulations That Put

Industry First, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1998, at D1 (discussing this trend of
"international business diplomacy" and reporting a variety of views expressing
concern about this development).
187 See Jan Narveson, The Obsolescence of the State: New Support for Old Doubts,
in GLOBALISM AND THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE STATE 3, 12 (discussing the state as
inefficient in the global market). See generally GLOBALISM AND THE OBSOLESCENCE
OF THE STATE (Yeager Hudson ed., 1997); DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATIONS (1999); DAVID HELD, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE MODERN
STATE: ESSAYS ON STATE, POWER AND DEMOCRACY (1989).
"" See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction, in GOVERNANCE IN
A GLOBALIZING WORLD 2 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 1999); Jeffrey
Frankel, Globalization of the Economy, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

45, 67 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 1999) (asserting that sovereignty
remains an impediment for effective globalization).
189 As evidenced by the de-emphasis on absolute sovereignty in international law
generally. PHILPOTT, supra note 184, at 3 (stating that intervention and integration
both challenge the sovereign state's "territorial supremacy"). See also id. at 18-19
(discussing different forms of sovereignty and noting that noting that sovereignty
need not be absolute). In addition to the doctrinal dilution of the concept of
sovereignty that has taken place in international law over the last fifty years, the
Internet has also posed some threat to a static criterion for determining what
sovereignty means in the context of cyberspace. See Keith Aoki, Considering
Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National
Sovereignty, "Global"Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 443, 443 (1998) (noting that we "live in a world of multiple, overlapping,
contradictory, and often times intensely contested sovereignties"). For another
perspective on the influence of the Internet on sovereignty, see generally Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role
in Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.

423 (1998).
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interests of domestic industry to greater and greater
degrees.19 ° As born out in the TRIPS negotiations, this
paradigm is manifest in most industrialized countries.'
Defining the nature of state responsibility (or, in
international law terms, "the function of the state") as
distinct from market forces, yet at the same time responsive
to market demands for harmonized legal regimes, is the
core issue implicated by the greater integration of the
domestic and the international domains generally
evidenced by the WTO Agreements. 92 As the traditional
and primary actor in international law, the determination
of state function influences how international governance is
constructed, regardless of the sub-interests or invisible
actors'93 that influence state behavior. Insights from the
work of political scientists, particularly international
relations scholars, are useful in helping to identify the
structural problems caused by the convergence of historic
notions of "sovereignty," dynamic processes such as

190

This trend is visible in virtually all corners of international activity.

See

Gerth, supra note 186.
191 It could also be argued that this is a characteristic of strong, highly evolved
states and that as developing countries proceed toward greater levels of political and
economic growth, this same pattern will be manifest in those countries as well. To
the extent that one accepts this somewhat evolutionary narrative of rent seeking,
then this critique is not directed at developed countries per se, but at the notion that
a state in the international arena is somehow set free from its domestically imposed
constitutional restraints and functions, and that its accountability to constituents is
effected by its membership and compliance with an international obligation,
regardless of the domestic costs of such compliance. Again, this argument seeks to
preclude the legitimate use of international fora and process to subvert,
simultaneously, the broader goals of international law and the imperatives of
domestic governance.
192 See SHAW, supra note 185, at 27-28.
Shaw describes and defines this
relationship as "nationality-internationality" and states that "this is the key
constitutive principle of high modern order. The idea of internationality is generally
entailed by that of nationality, and is also part of the constitution of nationality.
Each idea presumes and is constituted in relation to the other." Id.
19' Invisible because public international law only recognizes states as the
legitimate objects of the discipline. This constraint in the discipline is at least
partially responsible for the discipline's inability to fully rationalize the structure of
international intellectual property.
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globalization, the dialectic between the allocative efficiency
of intellectual property by state regulation, and the desires
of holders of private rights in such goods to earn economic
rents.
In the United States, the use of domestic implementing
legislation' to effectuate treaty obligations suggests that
the only bargains that will be made are those that Congress
will enforce by incorporating them into domestic
legislation.195
Implementing legislation, however, may
undermine the security and the predictability of an
international agreement because it invariably substitutes
domestic law as the standard for application of the

' Not all treaties implicate the legislative arm; thus, not all treaties may be
observed by executive action (or inaction). Other treaties may be "self-executing,"
i.e., the substantive provisions automatically become a part of domestic law. In
recent times, however, self-executing treaties have become more infrequent. The
focus on bilateral treaties by scholars who have worked on developing theories of
breaches of international agreements limits the broad applicability of the
conclusions to multilateral settings. See, e.g., John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of
a Treaty and Rationalist InternationalRelations Theory: The Rules of Release and
Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L.

REV. 1 (1997).

"' Of course, compliance in the sense of domestic legislation that incorporates the
substantive treaty provisions into domestic law is not the same as enforcement of
the substantive provisions of the treaty. Enforcement is the domain of the judicial
branch (both international and domestic) and, as mentioned later in this Article, a
judicial strategy of strict constructionism as a means of preserving sovereign
discretion, while maintaining fidelity to the treaty, may not yield results satisfactory
to treaty partners who construe the provisions differently, nor will it necessarily be
consistent with international law prescriptions. An economic analysis of how
separation of powers influences treaty compliance would yield important insights
into when implementing legislation signals prospects of deviation and the degree of
such deviation.
This would, in turn, provide some guidelines for domestic
compliance that may be explicitly included in future treaties. From a descriptive
point of view, it would also help to predict the necessity for harmonization under the
constraints of supranational adjudication. For contributions to the question of
treaty compliance in the context of separation of power doctrine, see John C. Yoo,
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-SelfExecution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) (arguing, in response to criticism to his
article advancing historical arguments in support of non-self-executing treaties, that
requiring domestic implementing legislation of treaties that touch on matters within
Congress' Article I, section 8 powers reflects strong adherence by the Framers to a
strong separation of powers doctrine).
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substantive treaty provisions.
At least in theory, then,
the use of implementing legislation may constitute an
implicit allocation of interpretive power to the state as a
matter of first principles.'97 Yet, the few TRIPS disputes so
far submitted to the WTO suggest that the commitment of
the dispute panels to the "rules-oriented" system has
resulted in a dispute settlement process that necessarily
(and, in some instances, justifiably) is less affected by the
specific policy claims advanced to justify alleged
derogations from TRIPS standards.9
This might be
defensible if the outcome is to reinforce a state's attempts to
fulfill its constitutional functions,'99 rather than to
undermine them.

196

See, e.g., Itar-tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82

(2d Cir. 1998) (citing the Berne Convention Implementation Act (BCIA) as the
source of law for selecting a conflicts rule). According to the court, Section 4(a)(3) of
the Berne Implementation Act amends Title 17 to provide:
No right or interest in a work eligible for protection under this title may be
claimed by virtue of... the provisions of the Berne Convention ....Any
rights in a work eligible for protection under this title that derive from this
title ...

shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of ... the provisions of

the Berne Convention.
Id. at 90 (ellipsis in original); Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100568, 102 Stat. 2853, 17 U.S.C. §101. See also The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v.
Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that while the Copyright
Act, as amended by the BCIA, extends certain protection to the holders of copyright
in Berne Convention works as there defined, the Copyright Act is the exclusive
source of that protection).
19' See Trachtman, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 335 (making the
same point, but with regard to the design of the international institution; suggesting
that design choices influence the decision to allocate power); Joel Trachtman, The
Theory of the Firm, and the Theory of the International Economic Organization:
Toward Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 470, 535-38
(1996-1997). See also Schneider, supra note 180 (outlining different kinds of
international institutions and variables that influence the willingness of states to
become members).
198 The design choice of the WTO suggests that states agreed to cede authority to
the WTO in the negotiated areas. See Schneider, supra note 180 (noting that
supranational adjudicative bodies pose the most serious threat to sovereignty
concerns).
199 By "constitutional
functions," the author is referring to the domestic
democratic process of law-making, as well as the intellectual property mandate of
the U.S. Constitution.
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Rigid adherence by classical Realists to a paradigm of
international relations based predominantly on state
preoccupation with power has been modified by alternative
theories that stress international cooperation and the role
of subnational actors in the international arena. These
theories provide important insight to the understanding of
the international system.
Nevertheless, the shared
interests that produce regimes inevitably are a function of
power."' 0 To the extent that states act in coalitional form in
the process of negotiating regimes, power and the desire for
institutions are relevant variables in the pursuit of
international cooperation."0 '
The fact that institutions
mediate the tendencies of "anarchical" international society
does not discount the role of power because the meditative
force of an international regime is defined by the continued
presence of a "demand" for that institution in the form of
incentives for states to comply. 2 Power thus influences the
nature and the possibility of incentives available
internationally.
In the area of intellectual property particularly, state
power is a critical variable for predicting outcome because
intellectual "property" is inherently a product of the

200

For a modern treatise on the coalitional strategies that are at the core of

Realism, see HANS MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1985).
201

See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and

International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 717, 731 (1995) (noting
that the international system contains elements of all three leading theories of
international relations).
202 This implicates the rationalist theories of state behavior that regime
theorists
rely on heavily. A more subtle point is, however, that shared interests that facilitate
coalitions can be a function of common positions of power in the international arena,
as illustrated by developed countries during the TRIPS negotiations.
The

compromise made intra-coalitionally between the developed countries reflects the

equal interests of these countries and the inability of one country to make a
unilateral decision about the TRIPS outcome. See Sjostedt, supra note 65, at 69
(noting the "leadership problem" stemming from the lack of U.S. hegemony during
the Uruguay Round negotiations because power relationships between the leading
countries had become more symmetrical).
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exercise of state regulatory powers. 2 "
Thus, domestic
political institutions are, consistent with Liberal theories of
international
relations,
even
more
important
in
determining what a state does in the international arena.
As for Liberal theories of international law, domestic
interests are significant in prescribing what the state
should do in the international context. The importance of
domestic constituents in influencing international outcomes
significantly raises the level and costs of domestic interest
group activity, as well as the cost of multilateral
negotiations. For the latter, domestic government failure is
associated with significant costs because the domestic
interest groups with the most influence will exert decisive
pressure on state behavior in international settings. Thus,
for example, if traditional U.S. political resistance to
international processes coincides with strong pro-consumer
interest group politics in the area of intellectual property
regulation, it is likely that deviation from particular TRIPS
decisions would be rational.
Consider, for example, that state "power" is largely
defined by domestic institutions. These institutions are, in
turn, accountable to citizens who may exercise that power
to exert pressure on the government, including voting the
government out of power. Consequently, one of the factors
that affect a state's strategy in international negotiations is
the composition and relative influence of domestic
constituents .
The reverberation of the cooperative
strategies between sovereigns in international negotiations
and the competing desires of relevant domestic interest
groups indicate that the effectiveness of "power" in the
international context is a reflection of the vibrancy of the
domestic political system.2 5
203

As Lloyd Weinreb has put it, copyright is itself a form of market intervention

and not a "natural" way of doing things. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional
Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1240 (1998).
204 See Putnam, supra note 138, at 442-50.
20 Id. at 449.
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Most international law and relations scholars recognize
the intrinsic value of democratic government." 6 Thus, the
domestic conditions that result in particular treaty
outcomes should have some consideration in the dispute
resolution process of the WTO. If the state lawfully cedes
the advancement of domestic social goals to an
international institution, then that institution should not
focus solely on the outcome of "order" between states as its
primary duty. Within the sphere of overlap between the
national and international domains, there must be an
evaluation of, and an accounting for, the substantive effects
of compliance. Indeed, as suggested earlier, interpretations
of treaty provisions by an international dispute body that
exacerbates domestic tensions between interest groups will
certainly contribute to the possibility of breach by a rational
actor. °7
B. A Review of TRIPS Disputes
The WTO dispute settlement process has been presented
with several important challenges since its inception in
1995.
A sampling of the disputes handled so far
demonstrate that the issues raised concern differences in
interpretation of TRIPS. More interestingly, some of the
disputes reflect the failure of diplomatic negotiations during
the pre-TRIPS era, and the dispute settlement process
provides a new forum to resolve issues that have been a
source of long-standing tension between developed
2
countries.
"
The system does not yet appear to be
strained 2 0 ' despite the demonstrated force of the process.

206

Indeed, Liberal international relations theory assumes the existence of

democracies.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 207 (1993)
(equating democracies and liberal states in describing the basic tenets of Liberal
international relations theory).
207
208

Putnam, supra note 138, at 444.

The EC complaint over Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act is an example of this
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From an international perspective, the WTO Dispute
Body's decisions have not been greeted with any
measurable displeasure among scholars. 2" The decisions
maintain a fidelity to the multilateral system as the end for
This has been accomplished
which the WTO exists.
through several judicial mechanisms. They include the
the rejection
interpretive rule of "strict constructionism
212
words,
other
(in
test
expectations"
of the "legitimate
careful adherence to the explicit rules of the TRIPS
and nothing more), and the implicit
Agreement
preservation of the moratorium on claims of nullification or
impairment.213 Each of these mechanisms reflects attempts
to circumscribe construction of TRIPS provisions as
Indeed, in
required by Article 19(2) of the DSU." 4
United
23,215
the
construing the requirement of Article
21
6
States 301-310 Panel found that the most relevant objects
and purposes of the DSU, and of the WTO in general, "are
those which relate to the creation of market conditions
conducive to individual economic activity in national and
global markets and to the provision of a secure and
resort to WTO dispute settlement to resolve pre-WTO grievances.
209 See generally Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20
(cautioning against use that might engender such strain).
21' The United States v. India decision was received quite well, although, as a
paradigmatic case, its general approval rating may not be a measure of the success
of the system. In general, there has been very little academic commentary on WTO
decisions, other than the recent copyright decision. See generally Okediji, Fair Use
Standard, supra note 21; Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?, supra
note 61. See also Dinwoodie, Development and Incorporation,supra note 61, at 775.
See Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 11, at 592-97.
21,
212 See United States v. India PanelReport, supra note 14, paras. 33-48.
213 See TRIPS Agreement arts. 64(2), (3) (providing a five year moratorium on
non-violation complaints which has been extended several times); Reichman, TRIPS
Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 454-55 (observing the danger of this
GATT doctrine in intellectual property matters).
214 TRIPS Agreement art. 19(2) (providing that the Panel and
Appellate Body
"cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in covered
agreements"). See also id. art. 3(2).
212 Id. art. 23 (providing that members must resort to and abide by the rules and
procedures of the DSU regarding any complaints of violation of obligations, or of
nullification and impairment of benefits).
216 U.S. Sections 301-310, supra note 76.
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predictable multilateral system."2 17 It further found that

"[o]f all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most
important instruments to protect the security and
predictability of the multilateral trading system and
through it that of the marketplace and its different
21
operators.""
The TRIPS decisions reflect the applications of these
principles and provide some insight into the development of
governing principles of WTO TRIPS adjudication. With
specific regard to the TRIPS Agreement, resort to the
dispute settlement process suggests, at least initially, that
the delegated responsibility for achieving the goals of
intellectual property protection ought to be a significant
factor in the construction of the obligations of member
states. For the reasons that follow, it may be argued that
narrow reliance on the text of the TRIPS Agreement is
insufficient to generate results that will foster the
accomplishment of identifiable welfare goals established by
national intellectual property policies219 or other national
priorities. Thus, resort to strict constructionism is not
necessarily the expedient choice of prudent judicial
functioning but the inevitable outcome of decision-making
in the absence of an enabling theory or policy mandate.
There is, as yet, no explicit international policy for global
intellectual property protection.22 °
This deficiency is
problematic because it deprives dispute panels of any basis,
other than the text of the TRIPS Agreement, 221 to evaluate
and rationalize their decisions.
Some scholars view
217

Id. para. 7.71.

218 Id. para 7.75.

219 Id. at 37 (noting that international organization may be necessary to assist in
the supply of international public goods). International intellectual property is an

example.
220 But see TRIPS Agreement arts. 8, 9.
221

As the Appellate Body has stated, "the words of the treaty form the foundation

for the interpretive process." WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan and U.S. Appeal

Concerning

Taxes

on

Alcoholic

WT/DSll/AB/R, at 8 (Oct. 4, 1996).

Beverages,

WT/DS8/AB/R,

WT/DS10/AB/R,
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favorably TRIPS panels'
strict textual adherence,
suggesting that strict
construction
preserves
the
appropriate domain of state discretion with regard to
intellectual property policy."'
Nonetheless, "strict
constructionism" is still constructionism.
Despite the
explicit caution in the DSU itself,2 3 dispute panels are
inevitably required to effect substantive provisions in
situations that are not tailored to "fit" the language of the
treaty. In other words, the process of applying substantive
provisions entails discerning the meaning of the agreement
and how that meaning should translate into specific acts of
implementation. The result of the interpretive process is,
thus, perforce an extension and expansion of the explicit
rule being applied.224 As the noted American legal scholar
Roscoe Pound observed, "[t]he face of the law may be saved
by an elaborate ritual, but men, and not rules, will
administer justice."225
The concept of mechanical
application of the law is a fiction that has, today, lost much
226
of its prominence in national and international settings.
The judicial function may be tamed by constitutional and
legislative constraints, such as Article 3(2) of the DSU, but
political and social forces ensure that the lawmaking
proclivity of courts and dispute panels is never completely
subdued. Further, a lack of policy will inevitably lead to
difficulties in assessing whether the TRIPS Agreement has
222

See Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 11, at 594-97; Reichman,

TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 446.
223

The dispute settlement system of the WTO

serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international

law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSU cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
DSU art. 3(2).
224 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.
L. REV. 12, 14-15
(1910).
225 Id. at 20.
226 See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 5 (1982) (asserting that "judicial law-making is a
permanent feature of administration of justice in every society").
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improved global and domestic social welfare,227 thus
introducing uncertainty in the compliance project of the
TRIPS administrative structure. This informal compliance
project constitutes a major part of the entire dispute
resolution mechanism.228
The seminal TRIPS dispute before the WTO was a
complaint brought against India by the United States.229 In
all respects, this case was paradigmatic of the arguments
and perceptions that fueled the felt need for the TRIPS
Agreement in the first place. It involved a developed
country versus a developing country. The subject of the
dispute was the alleged absence of protection for
pharmaceuticals in India, an issue that had long
symbolized the deep divisions between the North and the
South with regard to intellectual property protection.2 "' The
issue of pharmaceutical patents had also been fairly
contentious throughout the TRIPS negotiations, with India
at the forefront of opposition.231
On July 2, 1996, the United States requested
consultations with India, consistent with Article 4 of the
DSU and Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement, concerning
the lack of protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products and the absence of a formal system to file
patent applications for such products in India. The request
also sought to address India's failure to provide exclusive
marketing rights (EMRs) for these products as required by
TRIPS Articles 70(8)232 and 70(9). After the failure of these
227

Of course, it is possible to argue that the very enforcement of the agreed upon

standards in the TRIPS Agreement is a welfare gain.
228 See Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note 20, at 444-45

(noting the roles of the Council for TRIPS in promoting mediation, consultation, and
persuasion, and discussing the applications of the rule of transparency established
by Article 63).
229 See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at 2.
230 Id. at 2-3.
231 See GERVAIS, supra note 51, at 12-25.
232

Article 70(8) of TRIPS provides:

Where a Member does not make available as of the date of entry into force
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consultations, the United States requested that the DSU
establish a panel to examine the issue. A panel was
consequently established on November 20, 1996 with
standard terms of reference pursuant to Article 6 of the
DSU.
The Panel first identified specific disputed facts by the
parties.233 In particular the Panel observed that under
Indian law, international agreements require implementing
legislation before the substantive obligations will be
binding as a matter of domestic law.3 4 Upon conclusion of
the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Indian President
issued an Ordinance to amend the Indian Patent Act to
provide a means for filing and handling patent applications
for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products as
required by the TRIPS Agreement.
The Ordinance
permitted the submission of such applications, even though
these products were not yet patentable by virtue of the
TRIPS transition period, and it provided that the handling
of such applications would be postponed until the expiration
of the TRIPS transition period or until an application for
of the Agreement Establishing the WTO patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products commensurate with its
obligations under Article 27, that Member shall:
(i) notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI above, provide as from the
date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO a
means by which applications for patents for such inventions can be
filed;
(ii) apply to these applications, as of the date of application of this
Agreement, the criteria for patentability as laid down in this
Agreement as if those criteria were being applied on the date of filing in
that Member or, where priority is available and claimed, the priority
date of the application;
(iii) provide patent protection in accordance with this Agreement as
from the grant of the patent and for the remainder of the patent term,
counted from the filing date in accordance with Article 33 of this
Agreement, for those of these applications that meet the criteria for
protection referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) above.
TRIPS Agreement art. 70(8).
233 See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, paras.
2.1-.12.
23 Id. para. 2.2.

892

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

the grant of an exclusive marketing right was submitted, if
such occurred earlier.235 It further provided procedures for
applications for EMRs, the scope of the rights, and the
manner for their enforcement.236 The Ordinance was a stopgap measure to implement the provisions of TRIPS since
the Indian Parliament was not in session. It expired six
weeks after its promulgation, prior to any permanent
legislative change to the patent law. 2317 To fill the legislative
gap, the Indian government instructed the Patent Office to
continue to receive the applications as prescribed by the
Ordinance.13 ' However, no written record of the instruction

was ever produced to the Panel and no notification was
made to the Council on TRIPS.239
The United States argued that India had failed to
implement the obligation of Article 70(8) requiring the
provision of a mechanism to protect the novelty of the
applications and the filing date they would have received
but for the transition period. 24"

The United States also

alleged that Article 70(8) requires India to ensure that
those who did file applications pursuant to Article 70(8) (for
example, while the Ordinance was valid), or who would
have filed an application had a system been maintained,
receive a retroactive filing date to reflect the date they

23' Id. para. 2.3.
236

27

id.
A legislative amendment designed to make the prescriptions in the Ordinance

a permanent feature of Indian law was introduced to the Indian Parliament, first to
the Lower House (or "Lok Sabha") in 1995. The amendment passed the Lower
House and was subsequently introduced to the Upper House ("Rajya Sabha") where
it was referred to a Select Committee for examination. The Select Committee did
not conclude its work before dissolution of the Lower House in 1996. Consequently,
the bill lapsed. See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at paras. 2.4-.5.
211 Id. para. 2.6.
2" See TRIPS Agreement art. 63(2) (requiring members to notify the Council on
TRIPS of laws and regulations).
24 See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at para. 2.4. The so-called
"mail-box" system of Article 70(8) would preserve the priority date of the invention
for purposes of the actual processing of the patent application upon expiration of the
transition period. Id.
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would have received.24' In the alternative, the United
States argued that even if India had a valid mailbox system
in place, India had failed to comply with its transparency
obligations under Article 63(2).242

India claimed that it had indeed provided a "means" for
the filing of patent applications for pharmaceutical and
agricultural products sufficient to attain the objectives of
Article 70(8),243 and that the TRIPS Agreement did not

obligate it to change its Patent Act so long as some "means"
existed within its legal system to protect these
applications.244 Its legal mechanism for compliance with
Article 70(8) was a set of "administrative instructions" to
the Patent Office, directing it to store applications for
patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products.
India argued that these "administrative
instructions" were legally binding under its domestic law as
a matter of "absolute certainty."2 5 Thus, it was sufficient to
satisfy the TRIPS obligations. India further contended that
the U.S. claim for retroactive application of the novelty and
priority date was essentially a request for a ruling on how
India should remedy an alleged violation of Article 70(8).
With regard to the Article 63 claim, India argued that the
claim exceeded the Panel's terms of reference. In the
alternative, India argued that it was not subject to the
obligations of Article 63 until the expiration of the
transition period, and even if this was not the case, it had
published the elements of its means of filing that were
subject to Article 63(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.246
With respect to the mailbox issue, the United States
contended that once the Presidential Ordinance lapsed, no
formal mailbox system existed and therefore India had
241
242
241
244
241
246

Id. para. 2.13.
Id. para. 2.16.
Id. para. 2.2.
See supra note 232 (providing text of TRIPS Article 70(8)).
U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at para. 2.12.
Id. para. 2.22.

894

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

failed to comply with its obligations under Article

[Vol. 17
70(8).247

India responded that Article 70(8) did not prescribe a
particular method for filing patent's for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical inventions.245 India invoked Article
1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement which provides that "Members
shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their
own domestic legal system and practice" in support of its
view of the obligation imposed by Article 70(8).24 In India's
view, both legislative and administrative options were
legitimate "means" under Article 70(8). 250Indeed, several
companies had already filed such applications suggesting
that the "means" in question were in place and working.25'
The United States contended, however, that because of
India's previous actions in passing an Ordinance, and given
the fact that the proposed permanent legislation had failed
to pass the Indian Parliament, it was perfectly clear that
India knew that it had to amend its Patent Act to

implement Article

70(8).252

Further, while India had

notified the Council on TRIPS about the Ordinance, it did
not do so with regard to the means "that India claimed,
therefore calling its very existence into question." 25 3 The
United States argued that by failing to put a mailbox
system in place, India had failed to protect the legitimate
expectations of applicants, contrary to the WTO principle
that members should protect the expectations of the
247
248

See id. para. 4.1.
See id. para. 2.2.

249 Id.; TRIPS Agreement
art. 70(8).

"0 U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at para. 2.6.
The Panel noted that during the period that the Ordinance was in place, 125
applications were received. There was also evidence from the Indian Minister of
Industry that as of July 1996, 893 patent applications had been filed. See id. paras.
2.4, 2.7.
252 See id. para. 4.3.
253 Id. Since India had notified the Council on TRIPS about the Ordinance, the
United States argued that this notification made clear that the Ordinance was
required to provide a basis for such applications. Once the Ordinance expired, so did
the legal basis for such acceptance under Indian law.
21
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members as to the competitive relationship between their
products.254

In analyzing the claims of the parties, the Panel
commenced with a review of the applicable interpretive
framework of the TRIPS Agreement pursuant to Article 3.2
of the DSU, which requires that panels clarify the
provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with
"customary rules of interpretation of public international
law."255 The Panel noted that GATT jurisprudence is also a

source of interpretive guidance for the TRIPS Agreement,
In
pursuant to Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement.5
view of this, the Panel held that the protection of members'
legitimate expectations regarding competitive conditions in
other countries is a well-established GATT principle that,
according to the Panel, derives from the dispute settlement
provisions of GATT.257 The Panel went on to state that, "the
protection of legitimate expectations is central to creating
security and predictability in the multilateral trading
system. '258

The Panel concluded that India's asserted

administrative mechanism did not "sufficiently protect the
legitimate expectations of the parties as to the competitive
254

Id. (citing GATT Panel Report on Canadian Request for Consultation

Concerning U.S. Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/617534S/136, at 160 (June 5, 1987)). According to the U.S. v. India Panel, this GATT
Report "established clearly the importance of creat[ing] the predictability needed to
plan future trade." Id.
255 DSU art. 3.2. The customary rules of interpretation referred to by the DSU
have uniformly been identified as the rules of interpretation codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at
para. 7.18. These rules are embodied in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
which provides: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose." See Vienna Convention, supra note 29, at art. 31(1).
2'6 Article XVI:I of the WTO Agreement provides: "Except as otherwise provided
under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the
framework of GATT 1947." GATT art. XVI:1.
27 See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at para. 7.20.
258 Id. paras. 7.21, 7.41, 7.43.
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relationship" between their respective citizens, because the
administrative instructions did not provide a sound legal
basis to preserve novelty and priority. The administrative
means, instead, introduced "legal insecurity" to a process
that had been explicitly negotiated for the object and
purpose of assuring investors of their priority and novelty
dates in a country that previously had afforded no
protection for patents on such goods.259
The Panel
concluded that India had an obligation to take legislative
measures to implement Article 70(8),60 and its reliance on

non-legislative mechanisms did not satisfy the good faith
requirement of the Vienna Convention.2"' The Panel also
concluded that India had failed to comply with the
transparency requirement of Article 63262 and Article 70.9
regarding EMRs for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical inventions.263
India appealed the Panel's decision to the Appellate

Body.2 64 The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's decision on

the merits, but rejected the Panel's construction of the good
faith requirement of the Vienna Convention. In particular,
the Appellate Body rejected the "legitimate expectations
test" and held that the text of TRIPS already reflects the
parties' expectations.

65

The Appellate Body invoked the

limitation of Article 19(2) of the DSU, which prohibits the
dispute settlement process from adding or diminishing the
rights and obligations in the covered agreements. 266
Id. paras. 7.29-.41.
Id. para. 7.31.
Vienna Convention, supra note 29, at art. 31(1).
U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at paras. 7.44-.50.
20 Id. paras. 7.54-.64.
26 See WTO Appellate Body Report on India Appeal Concerning

It

259
260
261
262

Patent

Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R
(Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. v. India Appellate Body Report].
265 Specifically, the Appellate Body held that the concept of "legitimate

expectations" of the parties evident in GATT jurisprudence derived from nonviolation complaints of nullification and impairment which had been suspended with
regard to the TRIPS Agreement. See id. paras. 41-42.
66 Id. paras. 46-48.
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affirmed the Panel's decision, however, that Article 70(8)
requires members to provide a sound legal basis to preserve
novelty and priority, and that this construction is consistent
with the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement,
namely "the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights. 267
The Appellate Body reviewed India's claim that its
administrative instructions were sufficient to carry out the
obligations of Article 70(8). It found this claim to be
inconsistent with the language of the Indian Patent Law,
which precluded patent applications for pharmaceutical
products, and with India's own initial actions in
promulgating a domestic ordinance to implement Article
70(8).268
The Appellate Body held that since the
administrative instructions were in direct contradiction
with provisions of the Indian Patent Act, which precluded
the Patent Office from granting patents in the contested
subject matter,269 it was not a "sound legal basis" as
required by Article 70(8).27o Further, the Appellate Body
noted, as did the Panel, that India's own experts had
testified that there was a need for domestic legislative
implementation of Article 70(8).271 Finally, the Appellate
Body affirmed the Panel's interpretation of Article 70.9,
obligating developing countries to implement EMRs during
the TRIPS transition period or forego the transition period
and provide immediate protection for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical products.272
As the Panel had
observed, this was a carefully negotiated concession during
the Uruguay Round. 273 However, the Appellate Body found

that the Article 63 claim was outside the Panel's
jurisdiction and recommended a reversal of the Panel's
267
268

Id. paras. 56-57.
Id. paras. 62-71.

269 Id. para. 69.
270 Id. para. 71.
171
272

272

Id.; U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at para. 7.36.
U.S. v. India Appellate Body Report, supra note 264, at paras. 76-84.
See U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14, at paras. 7.29, 7.31.
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finding that India had failed to comply with this obligation
of the TRIPS Agreement.274
The Appellate Body decision effectively narrowed the
potentially sweeping ramifications of the Panel's ambitious
interpretive approach to the United States v. India
decision.275 By rejecting elastic doctrines such as "legitimate
'
expectations"276
as the measurement of the good faith
requirement of the Vienna Convention, the Appellate Body
provided a prudent, bounded approach to analyzing the
parties' claims. The rejection of the Article 63 claim on due
process grounds also suggests that the Appellate Body
would favor a strict, even formalistic, approach to claims of
TRIPS violations. From this perspective, the function of
dispute resolution is not necessary to redress all TRIPS
violations, but only those violations identified by members
as problematic between themselves. This approach offers a
two step structure for dispute resolution; it leaves the
responsibility of securing outward compliance with TRIPS
obligations to the informal process, and the responsibility of
substantive evaluations of compliance to the formal process.
The TRIPS system might then be considered self-policing in
the sense that once outward compliance is secured, the only
context in which substantive compliance will be evaluated
is in the context of dispute resolution. This is a prospect
that portends both the promise of accommodation of
sovereign prerogatives in terms of modes of implementation
and initial interpretation of obligations, as well as the perils
of uncooperative behavior in the absence of the deployment
of the formal process.
The EC was a third party complainant in United States v.
India, as provided by Article 9.1 of the DSU.277 However, on
April 28, 1997, the EC requested consultations with India
114

U.S. v. India Appellate Body Report, supra note 264, at para. 97.

27 See generally Reichman, Securing Compliance,supra note 11.
276 Professor Reichman has discussed the negative payoffs of this ruling for

developed countries. See id. at 595-600.
277 DSU art. 9.1.
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to discuss the absence of patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products in
India.278 Because the EC's complaint was in all respects
identical to the U.S. complaint, India objected on a number
of procedural grounds. 2'
This was the second TRIPS
dispute settlement case and, with the exception of some
procedural questions, the dispute did not yield any new
decisions in terms of the substantive provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement. Like the United States, the EC claimed
as a violation the lack of a formal system to permit the
filing of patent applications and the grant of exclusive
marketing rights for such products. Of interesting note is
that India argued that its implementation of the United
States v. India decision would satisfy the EC complaint and
that the EC should have brought its complaint at the same
time as the United States. However, the Panel held that
WTO members are free to bring claims at any time, and
that Article 9 does not limit this freedom.280
This second TRIPS decision is particularly important
because, as the EC explained,28 ' the enforcement options of
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU require the party seeking
implementation of a panel report to have invoked the
dispute settlement process as a complainant.282 Failing to
do so limits the ability to utilize the full panoply of remedial
action provided by TRIPS. 28 3 The Panel held that it was not
feasible for a single panel to be established for both the EC
and United States complaints because, at the time, the EC
had not yet engaged in consultations with India, which is a
necessary prior step to invoking the formal dispute

278

WTO Panel Report on EC Complaint Concerning India's Protection for

Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998)
[hereinafter EC v. India Panel Report].
279 Id. para. 4.2.
281 Id. para. 7.15.
281 See id.
282 See DSU art. 22(2).
2W

Id.
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process. 28 4 As to the scope of Article 10 of the DSU, 285 the
Panel held that the provisions did not constitute a
procedural bar to the EC claim. Therefore, the Panel
proceeded to analyze the claim in essentially the same
286
manner, with the same results as United States v India.
Following the seminal case of United States v India
other formally adjudicated TRIPS disputes have involved
conflicts between developed countries. 88
This is an
interesting development given the oft-stated lore of the
TRIPS imperative. Conventional wisdom rationalizes the
TRIPS Agreement as a function of the increased
dependency of developed countries, particularly the United
States, on information goods and the corresponding
integration of markets that allow developing countries to
imitate these goods without penalty.2 9 Accordingly, an
international agreement prescribing minimum standards of
intellectual property protection was necessary to prevent
further erosion of U.S. competitive and comparative
advantages in an integrated global market. This orthodoxy
would suggest, at least as an initial matter that the utility
of the WTO dispute settlement process will be most evident
EC v. India Panel Report, supra note 278, at paras. 7.15-.16.
Article 10 provides that the dispute resolution process should account for the
interests of other members and provides for third party status for members who
have a substantial interest in the matter and who have notified the DSU of that
interest.
28. The United States reserved third party rights. DSU para. 1.1.
287
U.S. v. India Panel Report, supra note 14.
2"88This is best explained by the fact that the TRIPS Agreement did not come into
force for developing countries until January 1, 2000, the date of expiration for the
transitional period. See TRIPS Agreement art. 65. Least developed countries and
former socialist countries were granted an eleven-year transition period. See id. art.
66. It is also likely that other conflicts have been resolved informally through the
use of consultations and bilateral negotiations. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Barshefsky Announces Victory in WTO Dispute
on High-Technology Exports (Feb. 5, 1998), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
releases/1998/02/98-11.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
289 This account is a standard feature of the vast scholarly literature on the
TRIPS Agreement. For a few examples, see generally Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards, supra note 139; Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age,
supra note 20.
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in claims of non-compliance brought by developed countries
against developing countries. 0
Perhaps with the
expiration of the transition period, this orthodoxy will be
vindicated.
Further, with the exception of United States v India, the
TRIPS disputes determined by the WTO have involved
challenges to legislative initiatives purportedly intended to
address specific domestic concerns in a manner consistent
with domestic policies-intellectual property or otherwise.
These initiatives are not all unmistakable violations of an
explicit TRIPS rule. The dispute panels in these cases have
had to construe TRIPS standards to yield norms that might
have been too costly to bargain for during TRIPS
negotiations.
The choice between rules or standards is typically made
during the bargaining process. As a matter of international
law, this choice may indicate where international
jurisdiction stops and domestic prerogative begins. 9'
However, in the case of the TRIPS Agreement, the
extensive negotiations that took place and the repeated
insistence by developed countries that intellectual property
must be protected at certain minimum levels in the global
market provides an interpretive context for dispute panels
290

Professor Reichman has cautioned against an overly litigious use of the

dispute settlement process. Reichman, TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age, supra note
20, at 460-62. This Article affirms Professor Reichman's caution but for different
reasons. These reasons include the prospects of ratcheting up the minimum
standards, the manipulation of international process, and the subversion of domestic
welfare concerns.
291 Even this suggestion is contested by international law scholars.
The question
is whether a state may exercise its sovereign prerogative when a treaty is silent or
when the treaty simply prescribes standards. Does the choice of standards over
rules defer construction to the state, as a matter of international law, with the
obligation that the standard be construed in a manner consistent with good faith
application of the treaty? In such an instance, is the only function of an
international forum akin to appellate review in the United States; that is, only if the
construction is clearly erroneous in light of the objects and purposes of the treaty
should it be deemed to violate the treaty? See generally Trachtman, WTO Dispute
Resolution, supra note 13.
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when construing the standards of protection for intellectual
property. This context provides evidence that the road to
TRIPS was paved very solidly with the bricks of high
protectionism. As a matter of treaty interpretation, then,
the WTO dispute panels have applied this high standard in
a manner that is utterly consistent with the articulated
intent of the members and, certainly, of the underlying subactors, the intellectual property coalitions. In the process,
panel decisions are likely to intrude upon the domestic
policy arena by interpreting TRIPS as the manifestation of
a new global intellectual property policy that supercedes
domestic intellectual property policy292 in much the same
way that international law, at least in theory, trumps
domestic law.29

29'

See WTO Appellate Body Report on Canadian Appeal Concerning Patent

Protection, WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Appellate Body
Report]. This case involved a claim by the United States against Canada, alleging
violation of TRIPS Article 33, which provides a twenty-year term for patent
protection. Section 45 of the Canadian Patent Act only provided a seventeen-year
term for patents issued on the basis of applications filed before October 1, 1989. The
United States argued that Article 70(2) of the TRIPS Agreement requires members
to extend the twenty-year term to existing patents; Canada disagreed with this
interpretation of Article 70(2) and argued, inter alia, that Article 33 applies
prospectively to patents granted on or after January 1, 1996, the effective date of the
TRIPS Agreement. Canada relied on Article 70(1) to support this argument. Both
the Panel and the Appellate Body agreed with the United States and held that
Section 45 of the Canadian Patent Act was inconsistent with Article 33. The Panel
and Appellate Body also interpreted Article 70(2), which extends TRIPS obligations
to "subject matter existing at the date of application of this Agreement for the
Member in question" to mean that the TRIPS Agreement applies to inventions still
protected on the date of application of TRIPS in Canada. Id. para. 101.
Consequently, the patents subject to Section 45 of the Canadian Patent Act were
entitled to the term of protection accorded by Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement. In
its conclusion, the Appellate Body noted that its decision did not "prejudge the
applicability of Article 7 or Article 8" of the TRIPS Agreement (which recognize some
sovereign discretion in intellectual property policy in light of domestic objectives) in
possible future cases with respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of the
WTO members that are set out in those Articles. Id. The Appellate Body concluded
that "[tihose Articles still await appropriate interpretation." Id.
293 Or, constitutional law trumps state law.
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In Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
294 the EC challenged sections of the Canadian
Products,
Patent Act that provided exemptions for the manufacture,
construction, use, or sale of a patented invention "solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information required under any law of Canada," or for
the same purposes in any other country, from infringement
claims."'
In essence, this provision allowed the use of
patented subject matter for purposes of securing regulatory
approval prior to patent expiration. The EC also challenged
the TRIPS consistency of the stockpiling provision that
permitted generic drug manufacturers to stockpile drugs
prior to patent expiration.296 The EC argued that by
allowing manufacturing and stockpiling of pharmaceutical
products during the six months before the expiration of the
patent term, Canada was in violation of TRIPS Articles 33
and 28(1).297 The EC argued further that to the extent these
provisions singled out pharmaceutical patents, Canada was
in violation of the TRIPS prohibition of discrimination in
the enjoyment of patent rights between fields of
technology.9
Canada argued that neither of the contested provisions
were violations of TRIPS obligations and invoked the patent
294 Canada Appellate Body Report, supra note 292.

29 Id. para. 2.1.
2'9 Section 55.2(2) of the Patent Act provides:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes, constructs,
uses or sells a patented invention ...
to make, construct or use the
invention, during the applicable period provided for by the regulations, for
the manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale after the date on

which the term of the patent expires.
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(2) (1985) (Can.) (repealed 2001).

'9' Article 28(1) prescribes the rights that a patent "shall" confer on its owner.
Where the subject matter of the patent is a product, the owner has the right to
prevent the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the
product. TRIPS Agreement art. 28(1)(a). Where the subject matter is a process, the
owner has the exclusive right to prevent unauthorized use of the process, and to
prevent use, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes the product

obtained directly by that process. Id. art. 28(1)(b).
298 Id. art. 27(1).
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limitations clause of the TRIPS Agreement,299 as well as the
"general welfare" provisions codified in Articles 7 and 8.3"0
Canada provided a detailed explanation of the public policy
concerns that animated the disputed legislation." 1
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, Canada maintained a
system of compulsory licensing consistent with the Paris
Convention, of which Canada was a member.
The
compulsory licensing regime was an important policy tool
for containing the cost of Canada's public health system by
allowing competitively priced medicines during the period
of patent production."0 2 With the simultaneous negotiation
of both the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the TRIPS Agreement, Canada preemptively
TRIPS Agreement Article 30 states that:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties.
Id. art. 30.
'0'These penumbral provisions establish guidelines for states to adopt policies
necessary to further identified social objectives. Article 7 states that the objective of
the TRIPS Agreement is the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights, which "should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." Id. art 7.
Article 8 provides as follows:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their national laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance
to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.
Id. art. 8.
...WTO Report of the Panel on Canadian Complaint Concerning Patent
Protection, WT/DS114/R, para. 4.21 (Mar. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Canada Panel
Report].
302 Id. This scheme had been in force in Canada since 1923. Id.
299
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amended its legislation to reflect the dominant sentiment of
the TRIPS negotiations and to eliminate completely, or at
least drastically reduce, the use of compulsory licensing
systems."3
The amendment repealed the compulsory
licensing provisions of the Canadian Patent Act, and
eliminated all compulsory licenses issued on or after
December 20, 1991.04

The amendment also sought to

continue the policy of containing healthcare costs while
providing a level of protection required by international
treaties.0 5 To continue to accomplish the public health
objectives targeted by the compulsory licensing system, the
amendment included measures both to "provide balance in
the post-expiry market, as contemplated by Articles 7 and
30 of the TRIPS Agreement," and to address concerns
regarding the costs of public health care that enhanced
patent protection would likely require.0 6 The stockpiling
provision was implemented to facilitate the production and
availability of generic drugs as soon as possible after patent
expiration.0 7
Despite the government's careful calibration of interests,
the Patent amendment bill generated intense public debate
and controversy in Canada.3
Proponents argued that
heightened protection would result in a more profitable
domestic industry and generate greater levels of research
and more jobs.0 9 Opponents argued that it would raise the
cost of health care to unmanageable levels and destroy the
generic drug industry. 10 Interest groups on both sides of
the debate lobbied the legislature and, as a result, some
modifications were made to the proposed bill.
The
dominant policy of maintaining a balance between the
303

Id.

304 Id.

305 See id.
306

See id.

311 See id.
308 See id.
309

Id.

310 Id.

906

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

domestic policy concerns and fidelity to the emerging
international requirements, however, remain unchanged.311
The WTO Panel held that Canada's stockpiling legislation
was inconsistent with Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement."'
Article 30, like its TRIPS copyright counterpart,
establishes a three-step test to determine if an exception is
legitimate. According to the Panel (and both Canada and
the EC agreed), three criteria must be met to satisfy the
TRIPS requirement: (1) the exception must be limited; (2)
the exception must not "unreasonably conflict with the
normal exploitation of the patent"; and (3) the exception
must not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of legitimate interests of
third parties., 314 Each of the three conditions must be
satisfied before a particular exception will be deemed to be
consistent with TRIPS. 15
Canada argued that the word "limited" in Article 30
should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning,
which would suggest something that is "restricted in scope,
extent and amount.""'
It argued that the stockpiling
exception satisfied this meaning because stockpiling does
not affect the patent owner's commercial sales to the
ultimate consumer during the six-month period when
stockpiling is allowed under Canadian law.1 7 In addition,
Canada argued that the six-month period is itself a
limitation on the exception and that the exception is also
311

3'

Id.
Article 30 deals with limitations and exceptions to patent rights. It states:

"Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."
TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
33
"'
315

316
317

See id. art. 13.

Canada Panel Report, supra note 301, para. 7.20.
Id.
Id. para. 7.27.
Id.
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limited to a narrow class of individuals who have made,
constructed, or used the invention for the purposes
identified in the Patent Act.318 The EC argued, to the
contrary, that the condition "limited" means "narrow, small,
minor, insignificant or restricted," and thought that this
should be measured by reference to the impact of the
exception on the "exclusionary rights granted to a patent
owner."319 The EC noted that "there was no limitation on
the quantities of drugs that could be produced during this
period, nor any limitation on the markets in which the
products could be sold., 32' Finally, the EC noted that no
royalty fees were required for such use, and the patent
holder was not afforded a right even to be informed of such
321
use.
The Panel first turned to the TRIPS negotiation history to
seek clarification of Article 30. The negotiating history did
not yield any information as to why the negotiators used
the phrase "limited exception," but the Panel nevertheless
agreed with the EC that the word "limited" in Article 30 has
a narrower connotation than the interpretation suggested
by Canada.322 According to the Panel:
Although the word itself can have both broad and
narrow definitions, . . . the narrower definition is the
more appropriate when the word "limited" is used as
part of the phrase "limited exception."". . . When a
treaty uses the term "limited exception," the word
"limited" must be given a meaning separate from the
limitation implicit in the word "exception" itself. The
term "limited exception" must therefore be read to
connote a narrow exception-one which makes only a

319

Id.
Id. para. 7.28.

320

Id.

321

Id.
Id. para. 7.30.

318

322
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323

To the Panel, the question of whether the stockpiling
provision was a "limited exception" depended on the extent
to which it curtailed the patent holder's exclusive rights." 4
The patent holder's rights to exclude "making" and "using"
is intended to cut off any supply of competing goods.
Because the Canadian stockpiling exception removed that
protection, patent owners' rights in this regard were
entirely abrogated.326
Further, although
Canada
acknowledged its obligation to preserve patent holders'
commercial benefits before expiration, the Panel held that
enforcement of the explicit rules in TRIPS means that
patent owners should enjoy an extended term of market
exclusivity even after expiration.2 ' According to the Panel,
the fact that TRIPS repeats a provision which exists in
other international intellectual property treaties is evidence
that the parties had knowledge of the universal market
effects and "can only be understood as an affirmation of the
32
purpose to produce these market effects.""
Consequently,
the Panel concluded that the stockpiling exception did not
meet the first criterion of Article 30 and, thus, was
inconsistent with Canada's obligations under Article 28(1)
of TRIPS .9
With regard to the regulatory review exception, the Panel
found that it was a limited exception within Article 30. 0
323

Id.

324 Id. paras. 7.31,
32 Id. para. 7.34.

7.34.

326

Id.

327

Id. para. 7.35.

328

Id.

329

Id. paras. 7.36, 7.38. The Panel did not find the limitations measure-the

time period of six months and the limited number of persons eligible to benefit from
the exception-sufficient to modify its conclusion. See id. paras. 7.37-.38. Since any
limitation must satisfy all three criteria in Article 30, and finding that the first
criteria was not satisfied, the Panel did not have to analyze the last two criteria in
the three-part test of Article 30. See id.
330 Id. paras. 7.45, 7.50.
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The Panel held that as long as the use was for a regulatory
approval process, the unauthorized acts permitted "will be
small and narrowly bounded."33 ' In particular, the Panel
noted that neither the exception nor the stockpiling
The Panel
provision involved any commercial use. 332
addressed the other two conditions of Article 30 and found
that the regulatory exception satisfied these as well.3 3
With regard to considering whether the limitation
interfered with the "normal exploitation" of the patent, the
Panel held that the scope of "normal exploitation" entails
exclusion of all competition during the patent term.334 The
Panel again acknowledged that the "basic" patent rights
typically will produce a certain period of market exclusivity
It did not agree with the
after expiration of the patent .
Canadian contention that any market exclusivity occurring
after the twenty-year patent term is more than "normal."3 6
The Panel did agree, however, that an additional de facto
period of exclusivity created by excluding use of the
patented item for regulatory processes was not "a natural or
normal consequence of enforcing patent rights."3 v
Consequently, it concluded that the regulatory review
exception did not conflict with the normal exploitation of
the patent.
Having concluded this, the question of
unreasonableness of the conflict was irrelevant to the
Panel's task.338
331
33

Id. para. 7.45.
See id.

=aa Id.
334 Id.
"3'

Id. para. 7.56.

3" Id. (rejecting as a "categorical proposition" Canada's argument that a patentee
is entitled only to a strict twenty-year term and no more).
33'

Id. paras. 7.57-.58.

As the Panel stated,
[Tihe fact that no conflict has been found makes it unnecessary to consider
the question of whether, if a conflict were found, the conflict would be
unreasonable. Accordingly, it is also unnecessary to determine whether or
not the final phrase of Article 30 ... does or does not apply.
Id. para. 7.59.
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The final condition, that the exception must not prejudice
the legitimate .interests of the patent owner, was also
resolved in Canada's favor. The EC argued that "legitimate
interests" means the full panoply of rights accorded by
Article 28(1) of TRIPS.339 The Panel disagreed and held,
instead, that "legitimate interests" refers to a "normative
claim calling for protection of interests that are 'justifiable'
in the sense that they are supported by relevant public
The TRIPS negotiating
policies or other social norms.
history, again, was silent on what the drafters meant by
this provision. The Panel concluded that in the absence of
guidance from the negotiating history to illuminate Article
30, it could only conclude that "legitimate interests" must
be construed broader than legal interests as suggested by
the EC.341 The Panel concluded that the EC's claim,
premised solely on the legal interests of Article 28(1), "did
not raise a relevant claim of non-compliance with the third
condition of Article 30."
Next, the Panel addressed the EC's secondary claim with
regard to the legitimate interest's prong of Article 30. The
EC argued that patent owners suffer economic loss because
delays in obtaining government approval prevent them
from marketing their product for a significant portion of the
patent term.343 The Panel held that delays in obtaining the
approvals
were
insufficiently
requisite
marketing
compelling to be regarded as a legitimate interest within
the scope of Article 30."' In essence, the Panel upheld the
consistency of the TRIPS provisions allowing product
testing and data submission for purposes of regulatory
approval.345

339 Id. para. 7.68.
340

Id. para. 7.69.

14,

Id. para. 7.71.

342

Id. para. 7.73.

343

Id. para. 7.74.

344Id.
141 Id. para. 7.84.
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Finally, the Panel determined that the evidence in the
record did not give rise to a plausible claim of
discrimination under Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.
The Panel held that the EC did not prove that the contested
provisions of the Canadian Patent Act were limited to
pharmaceutical patents, or that the adverse effects were
limited to the pharmaceutical industry. 34 6 The Panel also
rejected Canada's argument that important domestic
policies recognized in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement permit discriminatory treatment of certain
patents.347
The Panel concluded that the antidiscrimination rule of Article 27.1 applies to exceptions
authorized by Article 30.348
In another TRIPS dispute, the WTO process was invoked
in a claim against the United States. On January 29, 1999,
the EC invoked the dispute settlement mechanism to
challenge Section 110(5) 349 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 3 0 The
EC argued that Section 110(5), which establishes copyright
exemptions for certain home and businesses uses, is a
violation of the TRIPS Agreement. The dispute panel held
that Section 110(5)(B), the business exemption, is a
violation of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.351 In a
346 Id. paras. 7.98-.105.

347Id. para. 7.92.
341 Id. para. 7.93. According to the
panel:

Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to deal with problems that
may exist only in certain product areas. Moreover, to the extent the
prohibition of discrimination does limit the ability to target certain products
in dealing with certain of the important national policies... that fact may
well constitute a deliberate limitation rather than a frustration of purpose.

It is quite plausible, as the EC argued that the TRIPS Agreement would
want to require governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminatory

manner, in order to ensure that governments do not succumb to domestic
pressures to limit exceptions to areas where right holders tend to be foreign
producers.
Id. para. 7.92.
... See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
350 See 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 32.
351

See also 17 U.S.C. § 110(5).

See 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 32. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement

states: "Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain
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similar manner to the Panel in Canada-PatentProtection
of Pharmaceutical Products, the 110(5) Panel provided a
seminal analysis of the three-step test of Article 13, which
was based on Article 9 of the Berne Convention.11

It

concluded that the United States did not meet its burden of
proving that the business-style exemption does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder, 5 but upheld the TRIPS consistency of the homestyle exemption. 354 The 110(5) case has already been the

Thus, this Part will not
subject of some commentary.3
provide a detailed account of the dispute.

Following adoption of the Panel Report, the United States
the
intention
to
implement
communicated
its
recommendations and rulings of the decision but requested
"a reasonable period of time" to do so.3 On January 15,
2001 an Arbitrator ruled, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the
DSU, that a reasonable period of time for the United States
to implement the decision is twelve months from the date of
adoption of the Panel Report.357 The United States has not
yet implemented the WTO decision by changing its
In arguing for a longer period for
domestic law.3"'
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." TRIPS
Agreement art. 13.
352 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 32, para. 6.71
...Id. para. 6.265.
354 See Okediji, Fair Use Standard, supra note 21, at
123-36 (providing an
analysis of the TRIPS Agreement's consistency with the U.S. fair use standard and
evaluating the Section 110(5) decision in this context).
...See, e.g., id.
316 See DSU art.
21.3.

3" Id. Twelve months from the date of adoption of the panel report was July 27,
2001.
...As of this writing, the United States had not implemented the WTO decision.
On July 12, 2001, the United States requested that the "reasonable period of time"
for implementation of the rulings of the DSU be extended until December 31, 2001,
or on the date that Congress adjourns, whichever is earlier. According to the
communication by the United States, "such an extension of time would promote a
principal aim of the dispute settlement system, which is to provide mutually
satisfactory solutions to disputes." WTO Publication of U.S. Communication
Concerning a Proposed Modification of the Reasonable Period of Time, WT/DS160/14
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implementing the Panel decision, the government pointed
to, among other things, the "complexity" of the U.S.
legislative procedure, the Congressional schedule for 2001,
including the effect of the Presidential elections, and the
"controversy" that the repeal of Section 110(5) (B) would
entail, as well as its need to account for the "divergent
views of stakeholders."359 The WTO Arbitrator held that the
DSU requires "prompt" implementation of dispute rulings
and that the global nature of TRIPS obligations suggest
"that this is the type of matter for which Congress would
try to comply... as soon as possible, taking advantage of
the flexibility that it has within its normal legislative
procedures.
The Arbitrator held that any domestic
contentiousness regarding the ruling on Section 110(5) "is
not relevant" for the purposes of determining the
reasonable length of time a Contracting Party should be
given to implement a WTO decision.36 '
C. PreliminaryObservationsfrom TRIPS Dispute Settlement
The Section 110(5) case, as with the other TRIPS
decisions, are all breathtaking in their level and degree of
intrusion and indifference to the limits of domestic
governance. Again, while the TRIPS Agreement, as
negotiated, did not require any major changes to U.S.
intellectual property policy, the power of a dispute body to
determine the precise meaning and scope of the legal text
(July 18, 2001). On July 23, 2001, the United States and the EC agreed to submit
the dispute to arbitration as provided under Article 25 of the DSU. Arbitration
under Article 25 is an alternative system of dispute settlement. It is a wholly
separate process from the multilateral system of the DSU and is defined primarily
by the agreement of the two disputing parties. In this case, the purpose of the
Arbitration was to determine the level of nullification and impairment sustained by
the EC as a result of Section 110(5) (B). The Arbitrator's award is final as to the
dispute between the parties and is consistent with Article 22 of the WTO Agreement.
359 See WTO Award of the Arbitrator on Report of the Panel Concerning Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTfDS160/12, at para. 36 (Jan. 15, 2001).
'6o

361

Id. para. 39.

Id. paras. 41, 42.
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is, in the enforcement stage, nothing less than the
delegation of law-making authority to an international
body. Within this multilateral dispute settlement process,
the WTO's commitment to rules will ultimately force a
harmonization of norms to bridge the divisions between
intellectual
property policies of member states.
Particularly for the United States, the 110(5) dispute brings
to the surface a difficult issue for TRIPS compliance-how
to obtain the benefits of a more secure international order
for intellectual property protection while retaining
sovereignty over domestic policy and autonomy to respond
to domestic constituencies. As the economic analysis has
already suggested, the coordination game that produced the
TRIPS Agreement is not necessarily going to produce
compliance by developed countries, despite the fact that it
is their interests that TRIPS, at least in the short term, is
designed to effectuate.
A particularly revealing aspect of these disputes is the
way each of the Panels and the Appellate Body have ducked
the thorny question of how to apply the preambular
statements and the broad themes of Article 7 and 8 to
evaluate the substantive obligations of the TRIPS
Agreement. While tribunals can use strict construction to
constrict or expand the requirements of TRIPS, the
vagueness of these general qualifications in Articles 7 and 8
will likely lead to a one-way ratchet of rights. In each of
these cases, the dispute panels have invariably emphasized
the market preserve of intellectual property owners as a
dominant factor in determining whether a TRIPS violation
had occurred. Further, the cases suggest that the panels, in
focusing on the purpose and objective of the TRIPS
agreement, and the context of the negotiations, 62 have
362

In the Canada-PatentProtectionof PharmaceuticalProducts case, the Panel

stated that the interpretive context for the TRIPS Agreement is not limited to its
text, or to its Preamble and Annexes, but includes provisions of all the international
instruments incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement, as well as any agreements
between the parties relating to these agreements. Thus, the Panel reviewing the
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interpreted the provisions almost solely in light of the
economic expectations of the private right holders. This
was particularly evident in the 110(5) decision and the
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
decision. Indeed, according to the Panel in Canada-Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, the TRIPS
Agreement already reflects a negotiated balance of
competing interests.363 Thus, the provision for limitations
on patent rights in domestic legislation would only permit
"certain adjustments" and not measures or policies that
would amount to a renegotiation of this "basic balance."364
The TRIPS dispute settlement, then, turns the traditional
national/international paradigm upside down; it appears to
contemplate a substitution of domestic processes that have
produced a competitive balance in the domestic setting with
an international process that presumes that the domestic
balance should be renegotiated in light of the obligations in
the TRIPS Agreement. The decisions suggests that the
multiple levels of tension-between diverse legal systems,
between domestic policies themselves, and between
domestic policies and international process-were all
resolved in the TRIPS Agreement. Consequently, it is the
responsibility of the dispute settlement system to produce
decisions that reflect this resolution. The history of the
negotiations, however, certainly does not reflect a level of
understanding that is anywhere close to such a conclusion.
Cross-sectoral bargains, bargain linkages, trade-offs
between rules and other interests all indicate that the
TRIPS Agreement (indeed, all the Uruguay Round
Agreements) meant something different to different
governments. By "clarifying" negotiated rules, the dispute
resolution process will invariably produce norms that will
request for consultation concerning Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act felt
comfortable applying the context of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention to Article 30
of the TRIPS Agreement. See 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 32, at paras. 7.13-.15.

" Id. para. 7.26.

364 Id.
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guide the development of intellectual property regulation of
member states. It must do so in a manner that accounts for
the importance of mechanisms or policies designed by such
states to promote their domestic welfare goals.
The effect of WTO TRIPS jurisprudence extends beyond
pure intellectual property disputes to include other policy
interests.
In essence, any regulation of intellectual
property appears to fall within the TRIPS ambit so long as
the intellectual property category is covered by the TRIPS
Agreement. In a recent decision," 5 a WTO Appellate Body
ruled that Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations
Act (OAA) violates the TRIPS Agreement because it denies
owners of trademarks, trade names, and commercial names
that were confiscated by the Cuban Government access to
U.S. courts."
The EC argued, and the Appellate Body
agreed, that it was a violation of the national treatment and
most-favored-nation principle of the TRIPS Agreement.36 '
As in the other.TRIPS disputes, the Appellate Body rejected
the U.S. interpretation of this law36 and focused on the
interpretation of U.S. obligations under TRIPS.369 The
365 See Havana Club, supra note 18.
366 Section 211(1)(a) 2 provides:

No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of
rights by a designated national based on common law rights or registration
obtained under such section 515.527 of such a confiscated mark, trade
name, or commercial name.
Department of Commerce Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (1999). Section 211(b) further provides:
No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of
treaty rights by a designated national or its successor-in-interests under
sections 44(b) or (e) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e))
for a mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the same as or
substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was
used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless
the original owner of such mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the
bona fide successor in interest has expressly consented.
Id.
367 Havana Club, supra note 18, at para. 360.
368 Id.
369 Interestingly,

the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's ruling that trade names

are not covered by the TRIPS Agreement. The Appellate Body determined that the
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Appellate Body concluded that while its ruling was not a
"judgment on confiscation" as defined by the OAA, all WTO
members in choosing what position they might take on any
given domestic policy matter must comply with TRIPS
where "a measure resulting from and implementing... [a
particular] choice ... affects other WTO Members."370
The dominant approach of all these decisions is to
interpret the text of the TRIPS Agreement solely in light of
the concerns which animated the integration of intellectual
property in to the world trade system. Such an approach is
not inconsistent with the free trade model which, in its
classical mode, hardly admits of any limitations or
exceptions .371 Intellectual property rights have historically
been justified by reference to national priorities unlike the
free trade ideal, which from its earliest articulation, has
treated national and global interests as interdependent
parts of the welfare calculus. To some degree, the question
of the scope of international intellectual property rights is a
reflection of the indeterminate nature of these exclusive
proprietary interests in the domestic context.
In its long history, intellectual property rights have
existed primarily for the welfare of the state. The extension
of intellectual property rights to the global context, and its
rationalization as a free trade issue, obscures the
importance of national conditions and the priority of
domestic welfare goals even where these may be
inconsistent with globalization.
CONCLUSION

An examination of the TRIPS Agreement primarily
through the public health lens will yield both distorted and
TRIPS Agreement encompasses trade names. See id.
370 Id. para. 363.
171 See generally Gana Okediji, supra note 40 (comparing the welfare
ideal in U.S.
intellectual property policy with the welfare ideal in international trade).
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exaggerated results on both sides of the debate. Developed
countries, with significant investments in R&D and
pharmaceutical drug development can point to the high
costs associated with the production of pharmaceutical
products.
Developing countries faced with health
challenges will point to the avoidable but ongoing loss of
human life.
Undoubtedly, public health or other
development goals cannot be resolved simply by integrating
welfare interests in the interpretation and enforcement of
the TRIPS Agreement. However, intellectual property
rights play a vital role in determining what legal
constraints are imposed on governments in addressing
development concerns. Important structural changes are
needed in the current international rules governing the
protection of innovative endeavor and the enforcement of
associated property rights. The advancement of general
welfare, including the challenges of global health, requires
accountability on the part of institutions that manage the
international intellectual property system and the
processes
that
inform the
negotiation,
content,
interpretation, and enforcement of intellectual property
treaties. Where domestic institutions fail, international
institutions vested with such enormous responsibility as
the WTO should not remain indifferent to the complex and
important task of developing a jurisprudence of public
welfare.

